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I. INTRODUCTION
As skyrocketing health care costs threaten the survival of
federally funded health care programs, government prosecutors and
private parties are frequently turning to the Civil False Claims Act'
as their weapon of choice 2 in waging the "war" on health care fraud
and abuse.3 The False Claims Act is a powerful federal statute that
creates liability for the submission of false claims to the federal gov-
ernment. In the health care industry, a typical false claims plaintiff
asserts that a health care provider submitted a Medicare or Medicaid
claim to the federal government which was "false" because the
1. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
2. See Lisa M. Rockelli et al., Congress Returns to Medicare Reform, DAILY REPORT FOR
EXECUTIVES, Jan. 15, 1997, at Qui Tams/Lawsuits, available in LEXIS, Exec Library, DREXEC
file (calling the False Claims Act the "Government's sanction of choice"). The body of law that
deals with these concerns is often called "Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse law,"
although these regulations actually cover a much wider scope of activities. Laws such as the
False Claims Act deal with Medicare and Medicaid abuse by punishing those who miscode
services, bill for treatment which is not medically necessary, or bill for services not actually
performed. 2 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 15-1, at 245 (1995).
3. See John T. Boese, Qui Tam, Beyond Government Contracts, in QUI TAM, BEYOND
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS at 7, 16-17 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
H-456, 1993).
Health care fraud has played a substantial role in the recent escalation of costs for federally
subsidized medical care costs. Kim H. Roeder & Sara Kay Sledge, Concentrated Government
Efforts to Prosecute Fraud, and Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, Make Compliance Programs
Necessary for Health Care Organizations, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1996, at B5.
Health care fraud is the United States Department of Justice's second priority, ranking
after violent crime. See Keeping Fraudulent Providers Out of Medicare and Medicaid: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House
Comm. On Gov't Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. 51 (1995) (statement of Gerald M. Stern,
Special Counsel, Health Care Fraud, Department of Justice); see also Gregory T. Jaeger &
Jonathan L. Diesenhaus, Fractious Fraud Fights, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 21, 1996, at S32 (noting
the Justice Department's "high priority" for combating health fraud). The recently declared
.war" on health care fraud and abuse has received much media and political attention. See
Michael M. Mustokoff & Michael S. Yecies, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: The Government's
Most Wanted List, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 18, 1996, at 9 (explaining that health care
fraud and abuse is of the utmost concern to policymakers and politicians). The perceived threat
is so strong that every United States Attorney's office now has a criminal and civil health care
fraud coordinator to facilitate prosecution of these cases. See id.
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provider mischarged or overcharged the government. 4 In these cases,
the provider seeks to defraud the government by submitting false
assertions or false data.5
Recent revisions of the False Claims Act, however, have en-
couraged prosecutors and private parties to apply the Act to the
health care sector in new and creative ways. One of these innovations
is the "tainted claim." The tainted claim theory of False Claims Act
liability asserts that a violation of a separate federal statute "taints,"
or makes false, claims subsequently filed with the government. In the
health care arena, well-publicized tainted claims have involved alle-
gations that a violation of the Medicare/Medicaid anti-kickback stat-
ute6 tainted a subsequently filed claim for Medicare or Medicaid re-
imbursement. 7 This Note refers to these claims as "anti-kickback-
based tainted claims." Under this new theory of liability, the initial
anti-kickback violation renders a subsequent Medicare claim "false"
no matter how medically necessary and competently administered the
services were, or how bona fide the claim for payment actually is. 8
Thus, the alleged violation of the anti-kickback statute makes a claim
"false" not because the claim is incorrect, falsified, or misleading, but
because the provider violated a separate federal law.
The first purpose of this Note is to highlight the existence of
anti-kickback-based tainted claims and outline their development.
Accordingly, Part II of this Note gives a brief summary of the False
Claims Act and its qui tam provisions which allow private citizens to
bring false claims actions on behalf of the government. Part III pro-
vides a similar overview of the Medicare/Medicaid anti-kickback
4. See Boese, supra note 3, at 61-62. Common allegations include using false diagnostic
codes, United States v. Metzinger, No. 94-7520, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13666, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 17, 1996), ordering unnecessary tests, United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1481 (6th
Cir. 1986), seeking payment for services that were not rendered, United States v. Pani, 717 F.
Supp. 1013, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), and seeking reimbursement for services that were performed
but not medically necessary, United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. 1120, 1127 (E.D.
Pa. 1991).
5. Some believe the government is wielding this power indiscriminately. As one critic
noted, in their efforts to remove fraudulent parties from the health care system, prosecutors and
investigators may be "perform[ing] surgery with a butcher knife." Richard A. Feinstein et al.,
The Fraud Epidemic, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992, at 7 (stating that one result of overzealous
enforcement is that "good practitioners, fearing civil or criminal claims, may begin to practice a
new kind of defensive medicine through underutilization").
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994). The anti-kickback provisions are discussed infra notes
32-41 and accompanying text.
7. The most publicized of these cases are United States ex rel. Pogue v. American
Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1508 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), and United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997).
8. See Julie Johnsson, Supreme Court to Rule on Limits in Whistle-blower Suits, AM.
MED. NEWS, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1.
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statute. Part IV outlines the doctrinal and legal evolution of anti-
kickback-based tainted claims and summarizes the principal argu-
ments advanced against the viability of anti-kickback-based tainted
claims, namely that a violation of the anti-kickback statute cannot
render a claim "false" for purposes of the False Claims Act because
the violation cannot and does not cause the government injury.
This Note's second purpose is to point out that, in focusing on
the False Claims Act's requirement that a claim be "false or fraudu-
lent," the courts, critics, and others have ignored the underlying
structure of these new claims, which requires a false claims plaintiff
to prove a violation of the anti-kickback statute as a predicate for
proving a health care provider's claim false. Accordingly, Part V
overviews the implications of the anti-kickback-based tainted claim's
bifurcated structure and asserts that in recognizing anti-kickback-
based tainted claims as valid causes of action, courts have implicitly
allowed private citizens, as qui tam plaintiffs, to prosecute violations
of the anti-kickback statute. After concluding that the anti-kickback
statute contains no private cause of action or qui tam rights, this Note
asserts that a private citizen can bring an anti-kickback-based tainted
claim only by using the False Claims Act as a statutory "vehicle."
Concluding that the False Claims Act could not serve as a
mechanism for the prosecution of every other statutory violation, this
Note advocates analysis of the anti-kickback statute's legislative
history to determine whether Congress intended for private citizens to
prosecute violations of the anti-kickback statute by using the
statutory vehicle of the False Claims Act. Specifically, this Note
draws on the standards developed under analogous section 1983
claims as a basis for evaluating whether allowing a private citizen to
prove an anti-kickback claim through such a statutory vehicle is
consistent with congressional intent. This Note concludes that the
anti-kickback statute's comprehensive enforcement scheme
demonstrates a firm congressional intent to delegate all anti-kickback
enforcement power to the federal government. Accordingly, courts
should not allow qui tam plaintiffs to pursue anti-kickback claims
under the statutory vehicle of the False Claims Act.
1006 [Vol. 51:1003
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II. THE CIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The False Claims Act (the "Act"),9 is a civil statute o designed
to ensure the integrity of federal programs and the Federal Treasury
by deterring submission of false or fraudulent claims to the
government, to provide restitution to the government for money
fraudulently taken from it, and to punish those who defraud the
government.11  A false claims action may be brought by the
government or by a private party known as a qui tam plaintiff on
behalf of the government.
12
The focus of False Claims Act civil enforcement actions re-
cently shifted from the defense contracting industry to the health care
industry.1 3 In particular, use of the False Claims Act to combat health
care fraud and abuse is on the rise 4 due, in part, to recent False
Claims Act amendments that lowered the Act's scienter requirement,
9. Congress enacted the False Claims Act in 1863 in response to fraud and price-gouging
during the Civil War. See Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696; see also S. REP. No. 99-345,
at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273 (fixing the impetus for passage of the Act
in "rampant fraud in Civil War defense contracts'). For a comprehensive discussion of the Act's
history, see United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1994). The Act was revitalized in 1986 in an effort to combat the public and political per-
ception of increasing fraud against the federal government. In its current form, the Civil False
Claims Act reads in pertinent part:
(a) Liability for certain acts.-Any person who-
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the
United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement
to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim
allowed or paid; ... is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not
less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which
the Government sustains because of the act of that person ....
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994). Exceptions are also listed in the Act, along with circumstances requir-
ing assessment of certain damages and discretionary assessment of attorney's fees. See id.
10. Knowing presentation of a false claim to the government can also be a criminal act.
For purposes of this Note, however, "false claims" refers to the civil cause of action unless
otherwise noted.
11. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Provident Life
& Accident Insur. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
12. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). Qui tam actions are discussed further in Part II.C.
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RECOVERS OVER $1 BILLION IN QUI
TAM AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS (Oct. 18, 1995), available in 1995 WL 614572. The legislative
history accompanying the 1986 Amendments makes it clear that the Act applies to Medicare
and Medicaid claims. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 9 (stating that "[a] false claim for reimburse-
ment under Medicare, Medicaid or similar program is actionable under the act").
14. See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in
Government Contracting, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1802 tbl. 1 (1996) (documenting rise in qui
tam filings from 1987-1995); Catherine Trevison, Whistleblower Cases on the Rise, TENNESSEAN,
Feb. 2, 1998, at B1 (noting that qui tam lawsuits have doubled in the past two years).
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thereby making it easier to obtain substantial monetary rewards for
successful False Claims Act actions. 15
A. Elements of a Successful False Claims Action
In a typical false claims case, a plaintiff, whether it be the
government or a civil litigant, must prove three elements to prevail.
First, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant submitted a "claim" to
the government or that the defendant caused a third party to submit
a claim to the government. 16 Second, the plaintiff must prove that the
claim was false or fraudulent. 17 Finally, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant either knowingly submitted a false or fraudulent claim
or knowingly caused a third party to submit a false claim. s
B. Penalties and Damages
The large recoveries that occur under the False Claims Act
stem from the Act's two-tiered recovery provisions that allow the
15. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7)(C) (specifically noting that "actual knowledge" is not
required under the False Claims Act). In the federal fiscal year of 1995, qui tam plaintiffs
recovered approximately $243 million in statutory "bounty" for their assistance in bringing
these claims. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13. Thirty-six percent of these cases
involved health care fraud. See id. Some individuals have collected as much as $9 million. See
Tina Cassidy, Blowing the Whistle Has Big Rewards, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 1996, at Al. One
qui tam plaintiff received $5.52 million for his efforts in bringing Medicare fraud to the govern-
ment's attention. See United States ex rel. Flynn v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. L93-1794, 1995
WL 71329, at *9 (D. Md. Jan. 10, 1995). Michael T. Kogut, a Massachusetts Assistant Attorney
General, stated that "[tihe number of Qui Tam actions being filed... has risen enormously in
the last few years and many of them are in the health care industry." Tina Cassidy, Squeal of
Fortune, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 1996, at Cl. Kogut then referred to qui tam actions as a
"revenue raiser." Id.
16. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). The definition of "claim" under the Act has been the
subject of extensive litigation. See id. § 3729(c) (defining "claim" as "any request or de-
mand.., for money or property). The common understanding of a "claim" is "any demand or
request for payment" including invoices, vouchers, and oral or written requests for payment.
Boese, supra note 3, at 23. The 1986 Amendments added subsection (c) to 31 U.S.C. § 3729,
which defines a claim and specifically notes that indirect claims are included. See id. at 24.
Accordingly, claims submitted to either the federal government under Medicare or to state
agencies under Medicaid are subject to civil enforcement under the False Claims Act. See S.
REP. NO. 99-345, at 22.
17. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
18. See id. § 3729(b). The 1986 Amendments make clear that specific intent to defraud is
not required. Instead, "knowingly" means that the defendant had actual knowledge of the
information, acted in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information, or acted in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information. See id.; see also Wang ex rel. United
States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating error alone, especially errors
of judgment, will not trigger false claims liability). Mere negligence does not satisfy this
threshold. See Boese, supra note 3, at 27.
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government to assess treble damages 19 and a "per claim" penalty of up
to $10,000.20 Significantly, these penalties are calculated "per claim,"
which means "per line item," not "per bill."21 Because a single bill
may contain many line items, multi-million dollar False Claims Act
recoveries are becoming commonplace.22
C. The Qui Tam Provisions
Another factor contributing to the False Claims Act's increased
popularity is the Act's recently amended qui tam provisions,23 which
19. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The provision states that a False Claims Act violator "is
liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more
than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of
the act of that person." Id.
20. See id. These civil penalties are mandatory: The law requires courts to impose these
"fines" on the defendant. See id. (providing that courts may assess treble damages and must
assess at least double damages, even when defendant has fully cooperated). Civil penalties are
independent from damages. See United States v. Diamond, 657 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
21. See Michael Pretzer, Why You Should Have Been at the Health Lawyers' Convention,
National Health Lawyers Association's 1996 Conference, MED. ECON., Aug. 26, 1996, at 160, 166.
22. For example, in October 1996, the Government netted $119 million in civil and crimi-
nal penalties when it settled with Damon Clinical Laboratories. Medical Lab to Pay $187
Million in Civil, Criminal Fraud Penalties, 5 Health L. Rptr. (BNA) 1522, at 1522 (Oct. 17,
1996).
23. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). "Qui tam" is a term derived from the Latin phrase "qui tam
pro domingo rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur," which translates as "who sues on
behalf of the king as well as for himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990). Qui
tam plaintiffs, also know as "bounty hunters," "whistleblowers," "relators," and "informers,"
bring false claims actions on behalf of the government.
Congress added the qui tam provisions because of the difficulty in detecting fraud without
the assistance of those who are either close observers or are involved in the fraud. See S. REP.
No. 99-345, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269. For a discussion of qui tam
actions, see generally Frances E. Purcell, Jr., Comment, Qui Tam Suits Under the False Claims
Amendments Act of 1986: The Need for Clear Legislative Expression, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 935
(1993); QuI TAM LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, SECTION OF PUBLIC CONTRACT LAw
PROCUREMENT FRAUD COMM., A.B.A. (1994).
In pertinent part, the section reads:
(b) Actions by private persons.-
(1) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and
for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the
Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General
give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
The Act's current qui tam provisions are the result of congressional efforts to resolve the
inherent tension between encouraging private citizens to expose fraud while preventing oppor-
tunistic or "parasitic" suits which clog the federal system. See United States ex rel. Barth v.
Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that the False Claims Act at-
tempts to resolve the tension between encouraging private reporting and allowing suits by those
who did not discover the fraud); United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d
645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The history of the FCA qui tam provisions demonstrates repeated
congressional efforts to walk a fine line between encouraging whistle-blowing and discouraging
opportunistic behavior."). Congress amended the False Claims Act in the 1940s to avoid the
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authorize private citizens to bring an action in the name of the gov-
ernment against those persons or entities who submit false claims to
the government. To qualify as a qui tam plaintiff, the private citizen
must base his or her case on information that has not been publicly
disclosed, unless the qui tam plaintiff is the "original source" of that
information.24 Further, the qui tam plaintiff must follow the Act's
specific filing procedures.25 Successful qui tam plaintiffs can reap up
to thirty percent of the government's recovery in successful False
Claims Act actions.26 In addition, qui tam plaintiffs may be entitled to
attorney's fees and costs. 27 In sum, qui tam plaintiffs, and by implica-
tion, qui tam plaintiffs' attorneys, can make a healthy profit from a
single false claims action.
most visible abuses of qui tam actions-the use of public information to file qui tam actions.
Prior to this amendment, "mere busybod[ies]" could "race to the courthouse" to file actions based
on information copied from government files and criminal indictments. False Claims Reform
Act: Hearings on S. 1562 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 42 (1996) (statement of Jay B. Stephens, Deputy Associate
Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
When public perceptions of increasing fraud on the government grew during the 1980s,
however, Congress resurrected and reinforced the False Claims Act. In 1986, Congress lowered
the Act's scienter requirement to make false claims prosecution easier. See False Claims Acts
Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-562, § 2(b), 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 3729(b)) (expanding "knowing" to include deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard).
At the same time, Congress raised both the amount of a potential government award and the
percentage of that award a qui tam plaintiff could take home after successful prosecution or
settlement, and amended the statute to provide for treble damages dnd a per claim penalty of
$10,000. See id. § 2(a)(7) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7)). A qui tam plaintiff
can receive up to 30% of this award, whereas previously he had been limited to 15%. See id.
§ 3(d)(2) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2)).
24. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). See generally Susan G. Fentin, Note, The False Claims
Act-Finding Middle Ground Between Opportunity and Opportunism: The "Original Source"
Provision of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 255 (1995). In other words, a qui
tam plaintiff cannot simply hear about fraudulent activity on the six o'clock news, then run to
the courthouse to file a false claims action.
25. Procedures for qui tam plaintiffs differ from procedures for government prosecutors in
these actions. A qui tam plaintiff must first file his complaint under seal and serve the Attorney
General with a copy. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). Then, the qui tam plaintiff must make a
written disclosure of material evidence and information. See id. § 3730(b). Within 60 days, the
government must decide whether to intervene and take primary responsibility for the case. See
id. § 3730(b)(2). After the 60-day period expires the government may intervene upon a showing
of good cause. See id. § 3730(c)(3). If the government does not intervene within the first 60
days, the qui tam plaintiff may proceed uninhibited. As a matter of practice, the Department of
Justice seldom intervenes to dismiss a qui tam plaintiffs case. See Kovacic, supra note 14, at
1820-21.
In theory, the current Act allows the government to intervene in those cases it can pursue
with its own resources while encouraging meritorious qui tam cases it is not equipped to deal
with alone and discouraging groundless or vindictive cases.
26. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2). A qui tam plaintiff is rewarded even if the government
intervenes and eventually wins or settles the case. Qui tam rewards are limited, however, to
15%-20% of the government proceeds in cases in which the government intervenes. See id.
U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
27. See id. § 3730(d)(1).
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A qui tam plaintiff needs no government approval to file or
pursue a false claims action.28 However, during the sixty days follow-
ing the filing of the qui tam plaintiffs case, the government may in-
tervene and take control or petition the court to dismiss the case.
29
Yet, even in cases in which the government steps in, the qui tam
plaintiff has the right to "unrestricted participation" in the litigation
unless the case is "dilatory, harassing, repetitious, irrelevant or
unduly expensive. 30 After expiration of the sixty-day period, the
government may intervene only with court approval upon a finding of
good cause.
31
III. THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
The second statutory basis for anti-kickback-based tainted
claims is, of course, the anti-kickback statute itself. This statute
prohibits anyone from knowingly and Willfully32 soliciting, receiving,
offering to pay, or paying any remuneration to induce or in return for
28. See id. § 3730(b)(1). The increasing number of qui tam filings has depleted the
Department of Justice's Civil Division resources. In the six months prior to the 1986
Amendments, Civil Division attorneys spent 1,100 hours supervising and evaluating these
cases. From January to June 1990, the same group spent 11,000 hours on these claims. See
Kovacic, supra note 14, at 1840.
29. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). Forcing the Department of Justice to co-litigate with qui
tam plaintiffs has caused a number of problems. See Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment,
Settling for Less: The Department of Justice's Command Performance Under the 1986 False
Claims Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 409, 428-30 (1993). The qui tam plaintiff may
have a stake in seeing that the government does not intervene, as sole responsibility for the
case assures a higher reward upon success. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C)-(D). The Act's provisions allow a qui tam plaintiff to
"continue in the action as a full party" even when the government has intervened. False Claims
Reform Act: Hearings on S.1562 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 41 (1996) (statement of Jay B. Stephens, Deputy Associate
Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
31. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2). At present, the actual standard for the "knowingly" and
"willfully" requirement remains unsettled. While actual knowledge of a claim's falsity will
confer liability under the statute, it is unclear what level of "constructive knowledge" will result
in liability. See Robert Salcido, Application of the False Claims Act "Knowledge" Standard:
What One Must Know to be Held Liable Under the Act, 8 HEALTH LAW. 1, 3-4 (1996). See
generally Tamsen D. Love, Note, Toward a Fair and Practical Definition of "Willfully" in the
Medicare/Medicaid Anti-kickback Statute, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1029 (1997). At least one court has
attempted to clarify the anti-kickback statute's scienter requirement. See United States v.
Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985). Under Greber, a violation of the anti-kickback law occurs
when "an intent to induce is a consideration," and prosecutors do not have to prove that the only
purpose, or even a dominant, predominant, or significant purpose was the inducement of future
referrals. Id. at 71. Compare Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1399-400 (1995)
(stating a defendant must know conduct was prohibited by statute), with United States v. Jain,
93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that a defendant must "know that his conduct was
wrongful"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2452 (1997).
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the reference of items or services for which payment may be made
under a federal health care program.3 Violators may be fined up to
$25,000, imprisoned up to five years, or both.34 The remedial purpose
of the statute is to enable the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services CHHS") to protect federally funded health care
programs, as well as their beneficiaries and recipients, from
potentially harmful conduct.31 The Department of Justice, under the
Attorney General, enforces this statute under its express statutory
authority to enforce the laws of the United States.36 Unlike the False
Claims Act, the anti-kickback statute contains neither an explicit
private right of action, nor any qui tam provisions.
Courts have interpreted the anti-kickback statute broadly, and
have held that if any purpose for the referral, even if not a dominant
or significant purpose, was to induce future referrals, the conduct
falls within the statute's reach.37 If a provider's conduct falls within
the reach of the statute, the providers can be prosecuted unless the
conduct falls within one of the narrow statutory or regulatory
exceptions known as "safe harbors."3  The government has
acknowledged the overbreadth of the statute39 and has effected
33. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
35. The purpose of the anti-kickback statute is "to strengthen the capability of the
government to detect, prosecute, and punish fraudulent activities under the medicare and
medicaid programs." H.R. REP. No. 95-393, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039,
3040; see also Hanlester Network, 51 F.3d at 1401-02 ("The remedial purpose... is to ... protect
federally funded health care programs... from future conduct which is or might be harmful.").
36. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994) provides that: "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the
conduct of litigation in which the United States... is a party ... is reserved to the officers of
the Department of Justice, under direction of the Attorney General."
37. In United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d at 72, the court held that if one purpose of the
remuneration is to induce future referrals, the statute is violated. Other courts have supported
this holding. See United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d
20, 30 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that the expansive reading of the statute in Greber makes
irrelevant any discussion of the sole versus primary reason for payments because, under Greber,
any amount of inducement is illegal); United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 & n.1 (9th Cir.
1989) (per curiam) (noting that the statute is violated if the remuneration is not "wholly"
attributable to the delivery of goods and services); see also James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and
Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22
AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 211-19 (1996) (discussing Greber's implication for the evolving health care
industry).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (statutory safe harbors); Program Integrity-Medicare
and State Health Care Programs, 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1997) (regulatory safe harbors). For a
discussion of the safe harbors, see Blumstein, supra note 37, at 219-25 (discussing and
criticizing the safe harbor provisions).
39. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 100-109, at 27 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 682, 707-08
(recommending statutory change to identify which commercial arrangements will trigger anti-
kickback liability). The House Ways and Means Committee specifically stated that the 1996
amendments were made to ensure that existing law would not chill legitimate business ar-
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statutory and regulatory changes in an attempt to provide protection
for "innocent conduct that would otherwise be swept up in the fraud
and abuse dragnet."40
Specifically, in 1996, Congress amended the anti-kickback
statute and narrowed its scope by directing the Office of the Inspector
General ("OIG") to create new safe harbors, making advisory opinions
mandatory, and creating a panel to coordinate health care
investigations between the various government groups charged with
implementing the statute.41
IV. THE TAINTED CLAIM THEORY OF FALSE CLAIMS ACT LIABILITY
Instead of alleging that a claim is false because it mischarged
the government, a plaintiff under the "tainted claim" theory of False
Claims Act liability asserts that a violation of a federal statute causes
a "taint" that makes all subsequently filed federal claims "false."42
In the health care arena, the statutes giving rise to such
tainted claims include those laws that govern the structure of health
care business arrangements and general provider practices, such as
the anti-kickback statute, not those that govern the submission of
actual claims.
43
rangements. See H.R. REP. No. 104-496, at 84 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865,
1884-85.
40. See Blumstein, supra note 37, at 211 n.54. See generally Robert Salcido, Mixing Oil
and Water: The Government's Mistaken Use of the Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute in False
Claims Act Prosecutions, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 105, 109-15 (1997) (outlining history of the anti-
kickback statute's amendments).
41. A number of federal and state bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over health care
fraud problems. For example, a health care investigation could involve the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice (including the local United States Attorney's Office),
the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Internal Revenue
Service, Medicaid Agencies, and Medicaid Fraud Control Units. See Current Fraud and Abuse
Activities, OHIO HEALTH LAW UPDATE, June 1996, at 6, 7.
42. Plaintiffs have also used statutory or regulatory violations as the basis for a False
Claims Act action in other areas of law. For a brief discussion of the use of arguments akin to
the tainted claim theory of liability in environmental cases, see generally Paul W. Morenberg,
Comment, Environmental Fraud by Government Contractors: A New Application of the False
Claims Act, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv., 623, 665-68 (1995).
43. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (providing separate penalties for receiving kick-
backs). Another statute giving rise to tainted claims actions is 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (limiting
physician self-referrals).
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A. Development of the Tainted Claim Theory
Critics have labelled the tainted claim theory of False Claims
Act liability an "innovation" on the False Claims Act.44  Some have
called the theory a "leap of logic." 45 Although the tainted claim may
be a new strain of false claims action,46 its development was a
somewhat predictable by-product of the new incentives Congress
provided for use of the False Claims Act.47  For years, government
prosecutors and qui tam plaintiffs have used the False Claims Act to
combat more than the basic "false" claim for substandard goods and
services. 48  False Claims Act cases based on false negotiations, for
example, appear to demonstrate that False Claims Act liability
attaches not only to claims containing actual false information, but
also to claims based on material misreprentations to qualify for
government privileges or services.49 False Claims Act liability can
also arise in cases involving a contractor's false certification of
compliance with federal laws or regulations. 0 The typical "false
certification" claim occurs when a contractor uses false statements to
become eligible for government benefits. 51 One common type of "false
certification" claim, for example, alleges that a contractor made false
statements or assertions to obtain a federal loan guarantee.
52
44. Julie Johnsson, A Gold Mine in False Claims, 39 AM. MED. NEws, Oct. 28, 1996, at 1,
28; see also Kovacic, supra note 14, at 1805-06 (noting that the increased number of qui tam
plaintiffs and the substantial recoveries received by some of them "have provided the means and
incentive to explore the application of the far-reaching theories of fraud to a wider range of
contractor conduct").
45. Qui Tam Plaintiffs Often Arguing False Claims Violation, Attorney Says, Health Care
Daily (BNA) (June 12, 1996). The same critics concede, however, that these actions are
surviving dismissal motions. See id.
46. See Jaeger & Diesenhaus, supra note 3, at S32 (explaining that the increase in False
Claims Act cases has "spawned new theories of liability, many of which stretch the boundaries
of the FCA beyond its logical jurisdictional limits").
47. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (describing incentives for using the
False Claims Act under the 1986 amendments).
48. See United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding liabil-
ity under the False Claims Act where the defendant did not use the type of parts specified in a
government contract even though the parts that the defendant supplied were just as good as the
specified parts).
49. See United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir.
1977).
50. See Kovacic, supra note 14, at 1811 (discussing use of regulatory compliance certifica-
tion violations to supply requisite 'falsity' for False Claims Act actions).
51. See JoHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QuI TAM ACTIONS 1-27 to 1-30 (1997).
52. See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968). The Court held the
defendant liable under the False Claims Act for a fraudulent federal loan application because he
made a false statement "with the purpose and effect of inducing the Government immediately to
part with money." Id. at 232.
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These cases are valid false claims actions even if the source of
the fraud is not the substantive information in the claim itself but a
false representation of compliance with a statutory or regulatory
provision.53 Not all false certifications, however, will give rise to false
claims liability. Rather, a government contractor must falsely certify
compliance with some regulation or law which is a prerequisite for
obtaining a government benefit.
54
The "false certification" theory of liability led to cases based on
contractors' "implied certification" of compliance with laws or regula-
tions. This development grew out of the 1986 amendments to the
False Claims Act, which lowered the Act's scienter requirement and
made recovery for these actions easier.55 Under these provisions,
"deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard" for the truth may
establish the requisite intent.56 This lower scienter requirement has
allowed qui tam plaintiffs and government prosecutors to assert that
contractors have an implied duty to comply with all applicable federal
laws, regulations, rules, and procedures. 57 Either signing or submit-
ting a claim to the government implies the "certification" of this com-
pliance. Thus, the "implied certification" theory of False Claims Act
liability extends the notion of "false certification" to new grounds: No
explicit statement from the contractor is required to prove the claim.58
Under a false or implied certification claim, the "fraud" comes
not from the claim's substantive information, but from a false repre-
sentation of regulatory or statutory compliance. In these cases, the
causal relationship between the fraud and the harm the False Claims
Act was designed to prevent is more attenuated. Accordingly,
analysis of the false claims action in these cases will focus on causa-
tion; specifically, on whether a relation exists between the subject
53. See Boese, supra note 3, at 76-77.
54. See United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996)
(asserting a false certification can only create liability when it is a prerequisite to obtaining a
government benefit), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997); United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne
Corp., 880 F. Supp. 636, 638 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (finding that false certification of compliance with
environmental laws, where compliance is required under a government contract, states a valid
cause of action under the False Claims Act where alleged false claims were made to induce
payment).
55. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1994) (establishing "knowing" as the requisite level of intent
to falsify).
56. See supra note 23 (discussing amendments to the False Claims Act).
57. See United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir.
1995) (finding liability for noncompliance with the wage payment provisions of the Davis-Bacon
Act).
58. See United States v. Oakwood Downriver Med. Ctr., 687 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Mich.
1988) (indicating that false Health Care Financing Administration certifications are a proper
basis for liability under the False Claims Act).
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matter of the false statement and the government's loss. 59 Anti-kick-
back-based tainted claims, in contrast, simply assert that an alleged
anti-kickback violation somehow renders a defendant's claim false.
At present, the reasoning behind this assertion remains unclear. One
explanation is that these plaintiffs are asserting nothing more than
poorly argued implied certification claims. For an implied
certification claim, a plaintiff would argue, first, that Medicare or
Medicaid reimbursement submissions impose an affirmative
obligation on health care providers to ensure that all claim
information is accurate and in accordance with all pertinent statutes
and HHS regulations.60 According to this reasoning, when a health
care provider's signature implies compliance with laws and
regulations while, in fact, the provider has breached an HHS regula-
tion, the provider has been "deliberately ignorant" of or has
"recklessly disregarded" the truth.61 Second, the government cannot
pay claims that are contrary to the governing federal rules and
regulations, and providers have a duty to know the rules governing
payment.62 Logically, then, because the rules governing payment
imply a certification of statutory compliance, the submission of the
nonconforming claim is the submission of a "false claim," as it
requires the government to reimburse a provider not entitled to
payment. Thus, even where a provider's assertion of compliance is
59. See Boese, supra note 3, at 76-77 (noting that those who supply false information to be
eligible for federal housing assistance and who later default are liable under the False Claims
Act).
60. Presumably, this argument stems from statements made in the 1986 Senate Report:
"[Tihose doing business with the Government have an obligation to make a limited inquiry to
ensure the claims they submit are accurate." S. REP. No. 99-345, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.CA.N. 5266, 5272.
The use of the tainted claim theory has not been restricted to the health care arena. For
example, Barth involved a tainted claim argument for a federally funded construction project,
but the court dismissed the case on the grounds that the qui tam plaintiff was not the "original
source" of the information. 44 F.3d at 703. Other tainted claims actions have been successful.
In Fallon, the court found that a violation of a federal environmental statute, the Clean Water
Act, could serve as the basis for a false claims act action. See United States ex rel. Fallon v.
Accudyne, 880 F. Supp. 636, 638 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
61. The viability of the anti-kickback-based tainted claim is directly related to the 1986
Amendments to the False Claims Act's scienter requirement. Notably, in United States ex rel.
Hughes v. Cook, 498 F. Supp. 784, 787 (S.D. Miss. 1980), a qui tam plaintiff alleged a violation of
state medical licensure laws as a basis for proving the falsity of defendant's claims. The court
found the licensure violations insufficient to support a false claims action because the False
Claims Act required a "knowing" violation at that time. As one critic noted, under the Act's
current "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard" standard, this case would probably have
been decided differently. See David J. Ryan, The False Claims Act: An Old Weapon with New
Firepower Is Aimed at Health Care Fraud, 4 ANN. HEALTH L. 127, 148 (1995).
62. See supra note 60.
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not explicit, a statutory violation may still trigger false claims
liability.
However, under the implied certification theory, the subject
matter of falsity must be linked to the submission of a false claim. In
other words, if tainted claims plaintiffs are, in fact, arguing under an
implied certification theory, one would expect to see plaintiffs arguing
the causal relation between the alleged anti-kickback violation and
the government's payment of the claim. Courts, however, have not
systematically required a plaintiff to show that the "taint" of the
statutory violation caused the government to pay the claim.63 Under
an expansive view of the tainted claim theory, a plaintiff need not
establish a "relation" or "nexus" between the violation and the gov-
ernment's "loss." Under this reasoning, once a provider violates a
statute, all subsequently filed claims become false or fraudulent.
The implications surrounding acceptance of the tainted claim
theory are frightening. If the violation of any federal statute renders
subsequently filed claims false for False Claims Act purposes, hospi-
tals and other health care organizations could incur false claims li-
ability for a violation of an entirely distinct civil rights law,
employment law, or environmental law. State law could be invoked
as the basis for federal liability under the False Claims Act,
regardless of whether state legislatures intended this application of
the law.
B. Anti-Kickback-Based Tainted Claims
In the health care arena, tainted claims actions based on al-
leged violations of the anti-kickback statute or physician self-referral
laws 64 have received much publicity.65 Tainted claims based on anti-
kickback violations have been especially attractive because the anti-
kickback statute covers, and potentially makes illegal, many common
63. See United States ex rel. Sanders v. East Ala. Healthcare Auth., 953 F. Supp. 1404,
1411 (M.D. Ala. 1996). In Sanders, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's Medicare and
Medicaid claims were false because the defendant hospital was not in compliance with state
licensing requirements prior to submitting claims, despite the requirements of Medicare and
Medicaid regulations. See id. at 1410.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994). The "Stark statute" prohibits physicians from
referring their Medicare patients to an entity, or clinical laboratory, for "designated health serv-
ices," such as hospital in-patient and out-patient services where the referring doctor has a non-
exempt "financial relationship" with that entity. Id. § 1395nn(a).
65. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d
899, 900-01 (5th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F.
Supp. 1507, 1508 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
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health care relationships and practices. 66 Early efforts to claim that
illegal kickbacks made Medicare and Medicaid claims "false"
appeared in the early 1990s. 67 The Department of Justice has used
the anti-kickback-based tainted claim theory on numerous occasions
since, but most of these cases ended in settlement or were decided on
other grounds.68
Qui tam plaintiffs have reached the courtroom with these anti-
kickback-based tainted claims more often than the government.69 For
example, in United States ex rel. Roy v. Anthony, a qui tam plaintiff
filed suit against a group of medical imaging companies for payment
of referral fees that she alleged were anti-kickback violations.70 The
court, noting that a qui tam plaintiff has no private cause of action
under the anti-kickback statute, stated that the relator would have to
prove a violation of the False Claims Act to prevail.71 The court
explained, however, "[m]erely pointing to violations of the [anti-
kickback] statute will not suffice." 72 According to the court, the qui
tam plaintiff also needed to demonstrate how the anti-kickback
violations were also False Claims Act violations or how the anti-
66. The provision is wide in scope and can be read to prohibit what otherwise might be
seen as legitimate business practices. For example, seemingly benign practices such as spend-
ing funds on physician recruitment, or paying off physicians' student loans have been deemed
"kickbacks." See Jaeger & Diesenhaus, supra note 3, at S32 (stating that a hospital's agreement
with a physician to compensate for referrals may violate the anti-kickback provisions if it
includes compensation that exceeds the "fair market value" of the services rendered).
67. See United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1991). In
Kensington Hospital, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss because the govern-
ment had "stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, both because receiving payment for
services not medically necessary is fraudulent, and because the government need not show
injury resulting from the kickbacks in order to recover under the False Claims Act." Id. at 1128.
Because the court decided this case on multiple grounds, it did not establish the tainted claim as
a basis for a valid false claims action.
68. While many of these cases have ended in settlement, the apparent success of these
claims out of court is disturbing. Health care providers have lost time, energy, and substantial
sums of money in settling these cases. Both the 1994 National Medical Enterprises settlement
for $324 million and the 1995 Caremark settlement for $161 million involved allegations of anti-
kickback-based tainted claims. See Salcido, supra note 40, at 107 (discussing recent settle-
ments). For a case involving tainted claims dismissed on other grounds, see United States ex
rel. Buntin v. Lahue, No. 94-2101-GTV, 1996 WL 439298, at *3 (D. Kan. July 10, 1996) (granting
motion to dismiss because plaintiff was not "original source" of information).
69. Perhaps the reason that the qui tam cases have reached the courts more frequently is
that defendants may be less intimidated by qui tam plaintiffs than by the Department of
Justice. After all, qui tam plaintiffs control a case only if the Government chooses not to
intervene. This could imply that the case may be less compelling or less likely to succeed in
court. For this reason, a defendant might be less inclined to settle these cases.
70. See 914 F. Supp. 1504, 1506 (S.D. Ohio 1994). Prior to Roy, the viability of using
"tainted claims" to establish a False Claims Act violation had not been litigated to a judgment.
See Cincinnati Laboratory Faces Qui Tam Action, OHIO HEALTH L. UPDATE, Nov. 5, 1994, at 5.




kickback violations either led to or caused False Claims Act
violations. 73 Instead, the qui tam plaintiff claimed that the anti-
kickback violations occurred during, and in connection with, the
defendant's submission of Medicare and Medicaid claims.74 The court
found that the plaintiffs vague assertion that the kickbacks had
tainted the claims created "a tenuous connection" between the anti-
kickback statute and the False Claims Act.
75
This "tenuous connection," however, was sufficient to overcome
defendant's motion to dismiss.76 In so holding, the court in Roy im-
plied, for the first time, that if a plaintiff could produce evidence that
the kickbacks somehow "tainted" Medicare and Medicaid claims, the
plaintiff might have a valid claim under the False Claims Act. This
ruling, however, only suggested that the violations might support a
false claims action, and if so, that the claim might also require a
causal connection between the violation of the anti-kickback statute
and the false claim. Thus, the court in Roy recognized the viability of
an anti-kickback tainted claim action only skeptically.
In the seminal tainted claim case, United States ex rel. Pogue
v. American Healthcorp, Inc., the district court became the first court
to hold explicitly that a violation of the anti-kickback statute could
support a false claims action.77 Reversing its decision that anti-
kickback violations could not support a False Claims Act claim
because the government suffered no injury, the Pogue court allowed
the qui tam plaintiff to plead that a violation of the anti-kickback
statute could make a claim "false" for False Claims Act purposes.78
The qui tam plaintiff could prevail on his false claims action, the court
explained, if he could show that the defendants engaged in fraudulent
conduct with the purpose of inducing payment from the government.7 9
The Pogue decision is a landmark in two ways. First, the case
boldly stated what the Roy decision had asserted only timidly: A




76. See id. at 1506-07.
77. 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (M.D. Tenn. 1996). In Pogue, the plaintiff, a former director,
was fired from the defendant's corporation. The plaintiff alleged that, in order to boost refer-
rals, defendant American Healthcorp made payments to its medical directors. These payments,
plaintiff asserted, ran afoul of the federal anti-kickback and physician self-referral statutes. See
Court Alters on Whether Injury Needed for a Violation of the False Claims Act, 5 Health L. Rptr.
(BNA) 75, 75 (Jan. 18, 1996) (reciting facts of Pogue); see also Jaeger & Diesenhaus, supra note
3, at S33 (discussing "seminal" nature of Pogue).




false claims action. Second, the court denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment, rejecting the argument that the False Claims Act
requires "injury to the government." The question of whether actual
injury is a necessary element of a False Claims Act claim has become
the principal issue in anti-kickback-based tainted claims cases. 80
The next case addressing the viability of anti-kickback-based
tainted claims was United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia IHCA
Healthcare Corp.8 1 In Thompson, the qui tam plaintiff claimed that
the defendant had created illegal investment arrangements for and
provided financial inducements to physicians for patient referrals in
violation of the physician self-referral law and the anti-kickback
statute.82 These violations, the plaintiff claimed, made the claims
"false" for False Claims Act purposes. The qui tam plaintiff divided
this tainted claim argument into two separate ideas. First, he
claimed that the violations of the anti-kickback statute and the Stark
statute led to violations of the False Claims Act when the defendant
submitted reimbursement claims arising from medical services.8 3
Second, the plaintiff argued that the defendant submitted claims after
falsely certifying their compliance with Medicare laws.8 Thus, the
false claims plaintiff asserted both a tainted claim and a false
certification claim.
The district court disagreed with the plaintiff and dismissed
the case. First, the district court judge asserted that the violation of
the anti-kickback statute could not support a false claims action un-
der Fifth Circuit precedent.85 In the court's view, Fifth Circuit law
required that a claim itself be fraudulent or false in order for False
Claims Act liability to attach.8 6 Second, the district court judge held
that allegedly false certifications of compliance with Medicare laws
did not qualify as false claims. 87
80. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d
899, 900 (5th Cir. 1997); Pogue, 914 F. Supp. at 1513.
81. 938 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
82. See id. at 401. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated the Stark physician
self-referral statute by accepting Medicare referrals from doctors who held financial interests in
the defendant's companies. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 405 (citing United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456
(5th Cir. 1987)).
86. See id.; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
87. See Thompson, 938 F. Supp. at 406. Some critics have asserted that the Thompson
court's holding could also mean simply that if the plaintiff could identify the tainted claims and
show how these claims were false under Fifth Circuit law, the claim would be viable. Viewed in
this way, Thompson simply rejected the plaintiffs claim as pleaded, without rejecting the
tainted claim theory of liability as a whole. See Jaeger & Diesenhaus, supra note 3, at S33.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded
the case on the plaintiffs false certification claim." The court found
that the plaintiff could prevail on his false claims action if he could
show that the government conditioned the payment of defendant's
claim on the defendant's certification of compliance with laws
"regarding the provision of healthcare services," including the anti-
kickback statute.89 Yet, the court of appeals appeared to affirm the
district court's rejection of the plaintiffs tainted claim theory that, a
fortiori, violations of the anti-kickback statute rendered claims
subsequently filed with the government false under the False Claims
Act, at least to the extent these claims were based upon the anti-
kickback statute specifically. Agreeing with the district court that
"claims for services rendered in violation of a statute do not
necessarily constitute false or fraudulent claims under the FCA,"s° the
appeals court reaffirmed that "[v]iolations of laws, rules, or
regulations alone do not create a cause of action under the FCA,"91
and that the False Claims Act could not be used as an "enforcement
device" for every federal statute.92
In sum, Thompson stands for the proposition that anti-kick-
back violations may support a claim under the False Claims Act, at
least under a false certification argument, and the question of
whether anti-kickback violations automatically "taint" or make claims
filed with the government false remains undecided. Nevertheless, one
thing is certain: With the increased media attention given to these
claims and the large rewards qui tam plaintiffs stand to gain from
them, private citizens will bring more false claims actions based on
88. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899,
904 (5th Cir. 1997).
89. Id. at 902.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. Id. The appeals court, however, did seem to contemplate that a tainted claim theory
might be viable if based on violations of the Stark laws. In remanding the issue, the Fifth
Circuit stated:
If the district court determines on remand that claims for services rendered in violation
of the Stark laws are, in and of themselves, false or fraudulent claims under the FCA,
the the court should also consider whether Thompson has sufficiently alleged that
defendants committed separate and independent violations of the FCA.
Id. at 903. The separate treatment of the Stark laws is traceable to the laws' specific language,
which prohibits payment of Medicare claims for services rendered in violation of the Stark laws'
provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1) (1994); see also Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902 (relying on
such language to bar a False Claim Act suit). The anti-kickback statute contains no such
prohibition. The court of appeals, however, did not explain why and to what extent the Stark
laws' prohibition against payment mandated a different result on the tainted claims issue.
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anti-kickback violations, 93 that is, unless opponents of anti-kickback-
based tainted claims can persuade courts or Congress to rule
otherwise.
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANTI-KICKBACK-BASED TAINTED CLAIMS
HAvE FOCUSED ON THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT'S REQUIREMENT OF
FALSITY OR FRAUDULENCE
Opposition to the validity of anti-kickback-based claims has
been animated. 94 The critics of these claims have, for the most part,
focused their arguments on the "falsity" requirement of False Claims
Act claims.95 Specifically, they argue that an anti-kickback violation
cannot render a claim false for false claims purposes because the
kickback does not create an injury to the government.
The False Claims Act does not define the terms "false" and
"fraudulent."96 Courts have stated that a claim is "false or fraudulent"
if it should not have been submitted or is not "allowable."97  This
somewhat circular definition is unhelpful, however, because whether
a claim is "permissible" under this interpretation depends on whether
the claim is "false or fraudulent." Other courts have explained that
"fraud" for False Claims Act purposes is not common law fraud, s nor
93. Qui tam plaintiffs have started using the tainted claims authority in Pogue to bring
false claims actions based on other violations. See United States ex rel. Joslin v. Community
Home Health, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 374, 377 (D. Md. 1997) (alleging, unsuccessfully, false claims
liability based on noncompliance with state hospital license laws); United States ex rel. Sanders
v. East Ala. Healthcare Auth., 953 F. Supp. 1404, 1411 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (finding that the
defendant's alleged violation of state medical licensure requirements could serve as the valid
basis for a False Claims Act claim); see also Ryan, supra note 61, at 148-49 (noting increased
trend of using anti-kickback violations of the Stark laws to support False Claims Act suits).
94. See, e.g., Jaeger & Diesenhaus, supra note 3, at 532 (including anti-kickback-based
tained claims in a discussion of the new FCA theories "which stretch the boundaries of the FCA
beyond its logical jurisdictional limits"); Salcido, supra note 40, at 133-34 (arguing anti-
kickback-based tainted claims are invalid).
95. See Sanders, 953 F. Supp. at 1411 ("This court finds that the knowing submission of a
claim that falsely represented attainment of state licensing requirements is enough to consti-
tute a false claim.").
96. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994). Accordingly, courts have drawn from any and all sources
to flesh out this element. See Boese, supra note 3, at 24 (stating that "the falsity of a claim is
dependent on the confluence of factual, contractual, regulatory and statutory provisions
inherent in any [flederally funded activity").
97. See Boese, supra note 3, at 24.
98. Because the False Claims Act is statutory, elements of a common law fraud action,
reliance and actual damages for example, are not elements of a false claims action. The mere
submission of a "false claim" is enough to establish liability under the Act. See id. at 21-22.
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is "falsity" a mere mistake or empirical wrong.99 Rather, courts seem
to require something akin to a lie.100 Some courts have gone farther
and required a showing of an attempt to deceive the government into
payment.'0'
Critics and opponents of anti-kickback-based tainted claims
have looked to the False Claims Act's requirement that a claim be
"false or fraudulent" as the basis for arguing that a court must find
that the government suffered or could have suffered actual injury for
a claim to qualify as "false" for False Claims Act purposes. 10 2 If suc-
cessful, this argument sinks virtually all anti-kickback-based tainted
claims at the false claims stage because anti-kickback violations,
arguably, cause no actual, direct pecuniary harm to the
government. 0 3 When the government reimburses a qualified health
care provider for actually and competently performed medically
necessary services, the government reimburses the provider the same
amount regardless of whether the physician received or gave illegal
remuneration in connection with the provision of services. 1°4 In other
words, the government would receive exactly what it bargained for in
its contractual relation with the provider: the provision of necessary
and adequate goods or services at the price normally paid for those
goods or services. According to this reasoning, the government, that
is the public treasury, has suffered no actual "injury."
99. See Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992)
("What is false as a matter of science is not, by that very fact, wrong as a matter of morals. The
Act would not put either Ptolemy or Copernicus on trial.").
100. See id.
101. See United States v. Data Translation, Inc., 984 F.2d 1256, 1266-67 (1st Cir. 1992)
(denying liability apparently because the defendant's response to a question in a government
contract was a rational interpretation of the question, absent an intent to deceive).
102. See United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1508
(M.D. Tenn. 1996) (rejecting the defendant's argument). In most false claims actions, demon-
strating injury to the government is not difficult. Where a defendant submits a false claim or
defrauds the government, the defendant usually has intended to harm the government by
taking advantage of a contractual relationship in order to extract payment or benefit. See supra
notes 4-5 and accompanying text. The government's interest in protecting the Federal Treasury
is harmed to the extent the government paid for services or goods or quality it did not receive.
103. The same problem arises in other areas of health care litigation. One recent example
is the use of the mail fraud statute to enforce the anti-kickback statute. See United States v.
Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing mail fraud conviction because undisclosed
receipt of referral fees did not produce actual harm), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2452 (1997). See
generally Gregory D. Jones, Note, Primum Non Nocere: The Expanding "Honest Services" Mail
Fraud Statute and the Physician-Patient Fiduciary Relationship, 51 VAND. L. REv. 139, 173-76
(discussing Jain and the requirement of actual tangible harm).
104. Under the current Medicare payment system, most provider reimbursements are
made according to a fee for service, or fixed rate schedule. For further explanation, see
Blumstein, supra note 37, at 208-10.
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Unfortunately, however, courts are split over whether govern-
ment injury is a prerequisite to a successful false claims action.05 The
courts have divided into two camps: those that require actual injury
and those that do not.106 The Supreme Court declined the opportunity
to address this issue in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schumer, in which a
qui tam plaintiff claimed that the defendant's violation of a federal
regulation governing accounting procedures rendered a defense
contractor's claim false under the False Claims Act.107 Arguably, the
regulation violation did not cause an injury to the public treasury, and
defendant's noncompliance may have even saved the government
money. 08  The health care field anxiously awaited the Court's
holding,0 9 recognizing that if the Supreme Court held that injury to
the government is an essential element to proving a false claims
action, anti-kickback violations could no longer serve as the basis for
a tainted false claims action. In a unanimous opinion, however, the
Court declined to rule on the issue, and instead based its decision on a
finding that the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, upon
which plaintiffs claim relied, could not be applied retroactively. 10
The Supreme Court's refusal to resolve this issue does not bode
well for those relying on the "no injury" argument as a defense to
False Claims Act liability, as the Supreme Court's refusal to address
105. Compare Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1956) (finding
liability, despite the lack of specific damages where the defendant falsely used veterans' names
to purchase trucks pursuant to the Surplus Property Act), and United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1943) (affirming penalties for instances of fraud that the
government discovered before payment) with United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599
(1958) (stating that the False Claims Act "was not designed to reach every kind of fraud
practiced on the Government").
106. The "no injury needed" courts assert that recovery under the False Claims Act is not
barred because no actual damages were shown. See Pogue, 914 F. Supp. at 1509 (rejecting the
use of the Young-Montenay test on the grounds that the test required a showing of specific
damages in conflict with the Pogue court's determination that no specific damages were
required for a valid false claim action).
Conversely, other courts require proof of actual injury. See Young-Montenay, Inc. v. United
States, 15 F.3d 1040, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (establishing test requiring plaintiff to show that the
government suffered damages as a result of the false or fraudulent claim).
107. 117 S. Ct. 1871, 1874-75 (1997).
108. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 18 n.17, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex reL
Schumer, 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997) (No. 95-1340).
109. Hence, as their part of the "war effort," several health care associations filed an
amicus brief arguing against permitting these claims. The Association of American Medical
Colleges, the American Hospital Association, and the American Medical Association wrote an
amicus brief, as did the Jane Perkins National Health Law Program. See Amicus Brief for the
Association of American Medical Colleges, the American Hospital Association, and the American
Medical Association, Hughes Aircraft Co. (No. 95-1340) (supporting Hughes Aircraft); Amicus
Brief for the National Health Law Program, Inc., Hughes Aircraft Co. (No. 95-1340) (supporting
Schumer).
110. See Hughes Aircraft Co., 117 S. Ct. at 1878-79.
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the issue of injury certainly will not discourage proponents of tainted
claims and might make the lower courts more hesitant to take a stand
against these claims.
At the same time, however, something is inherently suspect
about using violations of the anti-kickback statute to support a false
claims action."' After all, false claims actions are often brought by
private citizens, and the anti-kickback statute provides for criminal
sanctions. Opponents and critics of tainted claims actions should
focus their efforts on the cause of this uneasiness, the anti-kickback
statute itself. To state a claim under the False Claims Act, a plaintiff
alleging an anti-kickback-based tainted claim must prove a violation
of a federal criminal statute.
VI. ANTI-KICKBACK-BASED TAINTED CLAIMS REQUIRE A PLAINTIFF TO
PROVE A VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
As stated above, an anti-kickback-based tainted claim asserts
that a government contractor's noncompliance with the anti-kickback
statute creates a "taint" that makes subsequently filed claims for
government reimbursement false. To prevail on this claim, therefore,
a plaintiff must prove that the defendant violated both the False
Claims Act and the anti-kickback statute. Thus, an anti-kickback-
based tainted claim is bifurcated: A plaintiff must prove first that de-
fendant violated the anti-kickback statute, and then must prove a
False Claims Act violation, in this case using the anti-kickback
violation to establish the falsity of the defendant's claim.
The reason that a plaintiff must prove the anti-kickback viola-
tion as part of his False Claims Act claim is simple. If non-compli-
ance with the anti-kickback statute supplies the requisite "falsity" for
a plaintiffs false claims action, a plaintiff must prove that the defen-
dant's behavior was not in compliance, that is, that it violated the
anti-kickback statute. If a defendant complied with the statute's
prescriptions, his claim cannot be "false" on those grounds. Only after
establishing a specific anti-kickback violation may the plaintiff use
this violation to support his False Claims Act claim.
Courts reviewing these tainted claims have not acknowledged
the unique bifurcated structure of these claims. Nor have courts rec-
ognized a more important practical reality surrounding anti-kickback-
111. See Jaeger & Diesenhaus, supra note 3, at S32 (observing that anti-kickback-b ased
tainted claims seem "headed beyond logical restrictions").
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based tainted claims: They are anti-kickback claims in false claims
clothing. First, because anti-kickback violations arise from the pay-
ment or receipt of remuneration,"2 these violations occur when two or
more members of the health care industry transact. Second, to qual-
ify as an anti-kickback violation, the remuneration must be paid in
connection with an item or service that may warrant payment under a
federal health care program."' Thus, these transactions fall squarely
within the ambit of the False Claims Act."4 Finally, when seeking
payment for the services or goods involved in the transaction, the
health care provider or supplier will seek payment from the federal
health care program, and this demand for payment will almost cer-
tainly qualify as a "claim" for payment from the government for False
Claims Act purposes." s Thus, in the vast majority of cases, a
transaction giving rise to an anti-kickback violation will involve a
claim submission upon demand for payment, a demand which is,
itself, an integral part of the transaction at issue in the anti-kickback
case.
As a practical matter, the False Claims Act claim can be as-
serted upon the demand for payment in anti-kickback cases. Upon
demand for payment, a "claim" is filed, and the alleged anti-kickback
violation, according to the tainted claim theory of liability, would
supply the requisite falsity or fraudulence. False claims plaintiffs will
undoubtedly argue that satisfaction of the False Claims Act's re-
quirement that the claim be "knowingly submitted" follows automati-
cally from proof that the defendant "knowingly" or "willfully" gave or
accepted the remuneration at issue. The anti-kickback statute re-
quires specific intent: Under the Hanlester Network standard for
anti-kickback liability, a defendant must know his conduct is specifi-
cally prohibited by statute,"16 and even under the more permissive
standard outlined in United States v. Jain, a defendant must at least
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
113. See id.
114. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (finding that False Claims Act liability is predicated on a re-
quest for money or property being made upon the United States); United States ex rel.
Alexander v. Dyncorp, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 292, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that annual and
interim reports to the SEC do not qualify as "claims" for False Claims Act purposes because re-
ports made "no request or demand upon the United States for money or property").
115. It is well established that claims filed under the Medicare and Medicaid programs
qualify as claims against the government within the meaning of the False Claims Act. See, e.g.,
Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 52 (5th Cir. 1975) (Medicare claim qualifies as "claim" for
False Claims Act purposes); United States ex rel. Davis v. Long's Drugs, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1144,
1147 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (Medicaid claim qualifies as "claim" for False Claims Act purposes).
116. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1399-400 (9th Cir. 1995).
1026 [Vol. 51:1003
FALSE CLAIMS
know his conduct "violated a legal duty."117 In contrast, the "knowing"
requirement in the False Claims Act is much broader, as it can be
satisfied by demonstrating the defendant's "deliberate ignorance of' or
"reckless disregard for" a claim's falsity.118 In this way, the False
Claims Act creates an affirmative obligation on those who deal with
the government to ascertain the truthfulness of their claims. 119 If an
anti-kickback violation resulted from a defendant's knowing offer or
acceptance of remuneration, then he would most probably "know" or
should know of the submission of the claim in connection with that
transaction. To the extent a court interprets the Act's requirement of
a "knowing submission of a false claim" to require that a defendant
knew simply of the underlying element that made the claim false (in
this case, the anti-kickback violation), the Act's scienter element
would be met. And even if a court requires a defendant to know that
the claim would qualify as a false claim for False Claims Act
purposes, a court could still easily find that the defendant recklessly
disregarded that the anti-kickback violation rendered the claim false.
In this way, the vast majority of anti-kickback violations will make
out, automatically, at least an arguable False Claims Act violation.
A false claims plaintiff does not have to prove the anti-kick-
back violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In a civil action under the
False Claims Act, the plaintiff has the burden of proving its case only
by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 Although courts have not yet
addressed the mechanics of these claims, it stands to reason that the
anti-kickback violation, because procedurally it is alleged only as an
element of the plaintiffs false claims action, need be proven only by a
preponderance of the evidence.' 21
In sum, the False Claims Act plaintiffs claim is like a house of
cards built on the anti-kickback violation: Without the anti-kickback
violation, the plaintiffs false claims action falls. Consequently, courts
should recognize what these false claims plaintiffs are really doing:
using the False Claims Act as a remedial statutory vehicle to pursue
117. 93 F.3d 436, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1996).
118. See supra note 32.
119. See Salcido, supra note 40, at 24.
120. See United States v. JT Constr., 668 F. Supp. 592, 593 (W.D. Tex. 1987).
121. Where a criminal violation is alleged as an element of a civil claim, the criminal viola-
tion need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See Palace Entertainment, Inc. v.
Bituminous Cas. Corp., 793 F.2d 842, 844 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Indiana law and stating that
"facts constituting a crime need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt if they are at issue in a
civil action, but that it is sufficient to prove the existence of the criminal act by a preponderance
of the evidence").
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what are, at the core, anti-kickback claims, in order to reap a healthy
profit.
VII. DISCREDITING THE RIGHT OF ACTION BASED ON A VIOLATION
OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
To recognize that Congress never intended to allow private
citizens to use anti-kickback violations to make out False Claims Act
claims, one must first understand that private citizens have no right
to bring anti-kickback claims independent of the False Claims Act. A
qui tam plaintiff, as a private citizen, has no independent standing to
prosecute an alleged anti-kickback violation. The Department of
Justice normally enforces the statute, 122 which provides for criminal
penalties, and a qui tam plaintiff does not meet the standard test for
standing to bring a claim. Namely, the qui tam plaintiff has suffered
neither an injury traceable to the kickback, nor an injury capable of
judicial redress.123 The arguable "injury" from a kickback stems from
the assumption that remuneration to induce future referrals will
increase program costs. 24 Thus, a private citizen is harmed only to
the extent that her taxes increase to cover any increased program
122. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
123. There are three constitutional prerequisites to standing. (1) the plaintiff must show
that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of defendant's
allegedly illegal conduct, see Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979);
(2) the injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, see Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976); and (3) the plaintiff must show that his injury is
"likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" of the court, id. at 38. Of course, the qu tam
plaintiff usually has no personalized injury that would confer standing under the False Claims
Act either. Yet, the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act arguably confer the govern-
ment's injury, and thereby its standing, to the qui tam plaintiff. See United States ex rel.
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 607, 610-11 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(finding that qui tam plaintiffs have standing); Valerie R. Park, Note, The False Claims Act, Qui
Tam Relators, and the Government: Which Is the Real Party to the Action?, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1061, 1078 (1991) (explaining and analyzing standing in qui tam cases). The Act's qui tam
provisions themselves have come under fire for unconstitutionally conferring standing on
private citizens. See United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., No. H-94-3996,
1997 WL 679105, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 1997) (holding the Act's qui tam provisions
unconstitutional for lack of Article III standing). See generally Frank A. Edgar, Jr., Comment,
"Missing the Analytical Boat": The Unconstitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False
Claims Act, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 319, 330-45 (1990-91). However, this Note does not take issue
with the qui tam plaintiffs right to bring the False Claims Act action itself, only with the right
to bring the anti-kickback violation before the courts. Thus, this Note will assume that the
False Claims Act's qui tam provisions are constitutional.
124. Cf Blumstein, supra note 37, at 208-11 (debating the legitimacy of this assumption,
particularly where reimbursement under health care plans is capitated, which instead creates
an incentive to underutilize medical services).
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costs. This is precisely the type of abstract injury for which the
Supreme Court has consistently refused standing.125
Without explicit standing to pursue an anti-kickback violation,
an uninjured private citizen might have the right to bring a claim
under the anti-kickback statute in three other ways: (1) through an
express or implied cause of action; (2) through express or implied qui
tam provisions; or (3) by using the statutory "vehicle" of the False
Claims Act to allow pursuit of an anti-kickback violation. 126
A. The Anti-Kickback Statute Contains No Express or Implied
Cause of Action
Courts use the four-factor test outlined in Cort v. Ash to de-
termine whether Congress intended to create the private remedy
asserted for the violation of statutory rights.127  These four factors
include the following: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether the
plaintiff can identify an explicit or implicit legislative intent to create
or deny such a remedy; (3) whether implication of a remedy for the
plaintiff is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative
scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action at issue is traditionally
relegated to state law.128 The test reflects a concern, grounded in
separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts should
control the availability of remedies for violations of statutes. 129
Consequently, a strong presumption against the creation of implied
rights of action exists. 130
Neither the anti-kickback statute nor its legislative history
suggests that Congress intended to provide qui tam plaintiffs with a
125. See Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217-18 (1974) (finding
that taxpayers challenging military reserve status of U.S. Congressmen under the
Incompatability Clause have no standing).
126. See infra Part VIII
127. See 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). But see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11, 23 (1979) (finding private right of action without the Cort test).
128. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78; see also City of Evanston v. Regional Transp. Auth., 825 F.2d
1121, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (stating that a congressional intent to benefit a class of
persons is a threshold test for implying a private right of action).
129. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that separation of powers principles require that the judiciary not imply private rights
of action); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742-49 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing that implying a private right of action impermissibly vests policymaking authority in
the judicial branch).
130. See Community & Econ. Dev. Ass'n v. Suburban Cook County Area Agency on Aging,
770 F.2d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 1985).
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right of action. 131 In fact, when applying Cort's four-factor test to the
statute, courts have held that the anti-kickback statute does not sup-
ply a private right of action even for those private individuals who
have suffered actual harm due to anti-kickback violations.132 If indi-
viduals harmed by violations of the anti-kickback statute have no
private right to prosecute these claims, a court could not reasonably
find legislative intent conferring such a right on an uninjured, private
citizen. Therefore uninjured private citizens have no private cause of
action to bring claims independently under the anti-kickback
statute.133
B. The Anti-Kickback Statute Contains No Express or Implied
Qui Tam Rights of Action
Another basis for conferring the right to bring an anti-kickback
claim would be qui tam provisions within the statute itself. If the
anti-kickback statute contained its own qui tam provisions, a private
citizen who simultaneously qualified as a qui tam plaintiff for the
False Claims Act and the anti-kickback statute could feasibly bring
an action under the anti-kickback statute and, subsequently, under
the False Claims Act. In this way, a private citizen could pursue an
anti-kickback violation by virtue of his qui tam status under the anti-
kickback statute, and then subsequently use this anti-kickback viola-
tion to support the claim under the False Claims Act.
Even if Congress can create legal interests that private citizens
may enforce in federal court, 134 these citizens may not enforce every
statute. Qui tam actions do not exist at common law, and they can be
maintained only under express or strongly implied statutory
authority.13 5 Thus, a strong bias exists against finding implied qui
131. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 104-496 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865.
132. See, e.g., West Allis Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251, 255 (7th Cir. 1988).
133. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 192-93 (1992) (discussing citizen suits).
134. See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 348
(1989) (questioning whether the Constitution allows Congress to authorize private citizens to
represent the United States in litigation). Professor Caminker argues that "[wlhile Congress
cannot itself 'execute' the laws it has enacted, it may structure the operations of the executive
branch as it finds 'necessary and proper' to ensure the executive's ability to execute the laws in
a manner faithful to congressional will." Id. at 357. For a discussion of qui tam enforcement,
see id. at 350-52.
135. Robert W. Fischer, Jr., Comment, Qui Tam Actions: The Role of the Private Citizen in
Law Enforcement, 20 UCLA L. REV. 778, 780 (1973) (describing the history and development of
qui tam actions in England and in the United States and noting that the "rights of qui tam
plaintiffs [in the United States] are always based on a statute").
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tam rights in a statute. 1 6 Moreover, even where statutory language
seems to grant the right to bring a qui tam action, if "other language
places enforcement in the hands of governmental authorities," courts
will not find implied qui tam rights. 137
Neither the text of the anti-kickback statute nor its legislative
history suggests that Congress contemplated the possibility that qui
tam plaintiffs could pursue these claims on behalf of the
government.38 Instead, Congress created a federal statute providing
for criminal penalties and delegated enforcement duties to the
Department of Justice. Because nothing indicates that Congress
intended to provide qui tam rights in the anti-kickback statute, and
because the statute places enforcement in governmental authorities,
no reasonable court could find congressional intent to give private
citizens a right to bring qui tam claims under the anti-kickback stat-
ute itself.
In sum, a private citizen lacks independent standing to bring
an anti-kickback claim and has no right to pursue an anti-kickback
violation under an express or implied right of action within the anti-
kickback statute. Furthermore, no right to bring an anti-kickback
claim under an express or implied qui tam right even exists within
Early federal laws implicitly allowing qui tam actions include: Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 17,
§ 5, 1 Stat. 622, 623 (failure to pay stamped paper duty); Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 20, 1 Stat.
527, 532 (failure to pay parchment duty); Act of June 9, 1794, ch. 65, § 12, 1 Stat. 397, 400
(failure to pay auction duty); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, § 5, 1 Stat. 373, 375 (failure to follow
transport regulations); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 51, § 21, 1 Stat. 384, 389 (failure to pay refined
sugar duty); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 48, § 5, 1 Stat. 376, 378 (failure to pay wine duty); see also
Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 95 ("In deciding which
penal statute permitted an informer to sue qui tam, the [early American] courts held that
permission either must be expressly granted or clearly implied in the penalty provision."
(citations omitted)). For a more recent attempt to imply qui tam rights into a statute, see Bass
Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 415 (N.D. Ala. 1971) (per
curiam) (distinguishing qui tam cases from cases where the plaintiff may share a criminal fine
assessed against the defendant).
136. Society, acting through the legislative branch "makes individuals the representatives
of the public for the purpose of enforcing a policy explicitly formulated by legislation." Priebe &
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 418 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Thus, "[s]ince
the qui tam action requires the delegation of some sovereign attributes, it is logical that some
clear statutory indication be required before they be delegated." Marra v. Burgdorf Realtors,
Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1000, 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1989). In addition, courts invoke qui tam actions spar-
ingly due to "the potential for collusive litigation that would estop the government from more
effective prosecution." Id.
137. Marra, 726 F. Supp. at 1013. Even the early cases discussing the implication of qui
tam rights recognize the need for a clear indication of congressional intent to that effect: "No
man can sue for that in which he has no interest; and a common informer can have no interest
in a penalty.., unless it is expressly, or by some sufficient implication, given to him by stat-
ute." Bradlaugh v. Clarke, 8 App. Cas. 354, 358 (1883) (appeal taken from Eng.).
138. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-247 (1989); S. REP. No. 100-109 (1987); H.R. REP. No.
92-231 (1972).
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the anti-kickback statute. Yet, private citizens are allowed to pursue
anti-kickback violations as part of their false claims actions. A civil
litigant's right to bring such a claim, therefore, must arise from the
False Claims Act.
VIII. ANALYZING THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AS A STATUTORY VEHICLE
FOR PURSUIT OF ANTI-KICKBACK VIOLATIONS
The courts recognizing anti-kickback-based tainted claims ac-
tions must make a critical, yet troublesome assumption: Because a
qui tam plaintiff must prove an anti-kickback violation in order to
establish a claim under the False Claims Act, this private citizen has
the right to pursue an anti-kickback violation simply by qualifying as
a qui tam plaintiff under the False Claims Act. With this assumption,
courts have implied qui tam provisions into the anti-kickback statute
by permitting the plaintiff to use the False Claims Act as a "statutory
vehicle" to pursue the violation of a statute which he otherwise would
have no right to pursue.
The concept of using one statute as a "vehicle" for pursuing the
violation of another is not unique to anti-kickback-based tainted
claims. For example, section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act allows cer-
tain individuals to bring actions against state actors for violations of
other, unrelated federal statutes.139  Likewise, the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("Civil RICO") contains
provisions for a civil cause of action under which litigants may sue for
damages based on proof that the defendant engaged in, among other
things, racketeering activity. 140 Although section 1983 and Civil RICO
allow private citizens to pursue other statutory claims, extending this
reasoning to the False Claims Act, and thereby allowing a private
citizen to pursue an anti-kickback violation under the Act, is more
problematic.
Both section 1983 and Civil RICO act as a statutory "vehicle"
by explicitly creating a right in civil litigants to pursue claims arising
from the violation of certain laws.'4' Thus Congress's intent to allow
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing a cause of action for "the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States); see
also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (recognizing that federal statutory violations may
be actionable under section 1983).
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing a cause of action for "the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States); 18 U.S.C.
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private litigants to use section 1983 and Civil RICO to pursue other
statutory violations is readily discernible within the text of both
statutes. The first problem in allowing the False Claims Act to serve
as the statutory vehicle for pursuit of anti-kickback violations is that
the False Claims Act does not explicitly create such statutory
"vehicle" rights, raising the issue of whether Congress intended for
the Act to be used in this fashion.
On one hand, it seems likely that Congress intended to enable
qui tam plaintiffs to bring claims based on some statutory viola-
tions.142 It is also clear, on the other hand, that the False Claims Act
"was not designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced on the gov-
ernment."43 Otherwise, the False Claims Act would be impermissibly
transformed into a general enforcement statute.44 The problem
courts face, then, is determining when a statutory violation may
appropriately support a false claims action, and, concomitantly, when
it is appropriate for a court to allow a civil litigant, as a qui tam
plaintiff, to bring such a claim. This Note argues that the structure of
anti-kickback-based tainted claims impermissibly interferes with the
integrity of the anti-kickback statute and that courts, accordingly,
should find anti-kickback-based tainted claims to be an improper use
of the False Claims Act.
A. Application of Section 1983 Preclusion Analysis to the Tainted
Claim Theory of Liability
The argument that anti-kickback-based tainted claims are an
impermissible use of the False Claims Act draws on other areas of the
law in which statutory vehicles are used. Specifically, when faced
with a section 1983 claim, courts face a strikingly similar determina-
tion: whether a private citizen may bring a claim for a federal statu-
tory violation via the statutory vehicle of section 1983. The structural
similarities between section 1983 and the use of the False Claims Act
§ 1964 (providing a cause of action for "[amny person injured in his business or property" by
racketeering activity).
142. For example, many false and implied certification claims are based on other statutory
or regulatory violations. See supra Part IV.A (discussing false and implied certification claims);
see also Salcido, supra note 40, at 130.
143. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958); see also United States ex rel.
Hughes v. Cook, 498 F. Supp. 784, 787 (S.D. Miss. 1980) (finding no inference of fraud from
mere submission of claim for necessary medical services even when plaintiff alleged physician-
defendant had submitted claims when no medical license was properly filed with the state).
144. See United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1977)
(stating the False Claims Act is not a general enforcement device for federal statutes such as
the Anti-Pinkerton Act).
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under the tainted claim theory of liability make it appropriate to
apply section 1983 analysis, by analogy, to examination of the
propriety of these tainted claims. Application of these standards
demonstrates that in permitting private citizens to pursue violations
of the anti-kickback statute under the False Claims Act, courts have
impermissibly negated congressional delineation of comprehensive
remedial and enforcement schemes under the anti-kickback statute
itself.4
5
As mentioned above, section 1983 provides a cause of action to
private parties for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities" secured either by the United States Constitution or by federal
statutes.146 Congress created section 1983 to provide a private reme-
dial scheme to individuals who otherwise would have no means of
redress. 147 However, just as the Supreme Court has noted that not
every fraud will give rise to false claims liability,148 the Court has
recognized exceptions to when a plaintiff may pursue a federal statu-
tory violation under a section 1983 claim. 49 For example, a plaintiff
may not pursue a remedy under section 1983 for a federal statutory
violation if Congress foreclosed private enforcement in the statute
itself. 50
145. The idea to link analysis of anti-kickback-based tainted claims and section 1983 juris-
prudence arose from a discussion with Professor James F. Blumstein of the Vanderbilt
University School of Law. In addition, a few courts faced with false claims actions based on
other statutory violations have mentioned the possibility of such analysis. See, e.g., Pickens v.
Kanawha River Towing, 916 F. Supp. 702, 705-06 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (rejecting defendant's section
1983 preclusion claim because there was no "positive repugnancy" between the False Claims Act
and the underlying statute, the Clean Water Act). However, the analogy between tainted false
claims actions and section 1983 should not be confused with the argument of some critics that
the anti-kickback statute itself strictly preempts the use of the False Claims Act in these cases.
See, e.g., Salcido, supra note 40, at 133-34 (arguing, among other things, that Congress intended
the anti-kickback statute to be the exclusive remedy for illegal remunerations).
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (recognizing
that section 1983 provides a cause of action for federal statutes as well as for consitutional
violations).
147. See David C. Frederick, Note, Comprehensive Remedies and Statutory Section 1983
Actions: Context as a Guide to Procedural Fairness, 67 TEx. L. REV. 627, 644 (1989).
148. See McNinch, 356 U.S. at 599 (stating that the False Claims Act was "not designed to
reach every kind of fraud practiced on the Government").
149. In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990), the Court stated: "A
plaintiff alleging a violation of a federal statute will be permitted to sue under [section] 1983
unless (1) 'the statute [does] not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the
meaning of § 1983,' or (2) 'Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the
enactment itself.'" (quoting Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418,
423 (1987)) (alteration in original).
150. See id.; see also Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 365 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wilder). The first exception to the applicability of section 1983 to federal statutory
violations, the question of whether a federal statute creates enforceable rights, is largely
inapplicable to a qui tam plaintiffs false claims action. The government is the real party to a
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Congressional intent to foreclose section 1983 remedies may be
found in the express provisions of the statute or where other "specific
evidence" within the statute itself demonstrates such intent.151 More
precisely, where the statute itself "creates a remedial scheme that is
'sufficiently comprehensive.., to demonstrate congressional intent to
preclude the remedy of suits under [section] 1983,' "152 or where
Congress has provided a comprehensive enforcement mechanism for
the protection of a federal right, a section 1983 remedy is not avail-
able. 53 In essence, courts use the comprehensive remedies test to
determine whether the underlying statute provides adequate proce-
dural protections for the rights it creates, negating the need for a
section 1983 right of action.54
The preclusion of section 1983 enforcement of these federal
statutes arises from concerns similar to the concerns lurking behind
anti-kickback-based tainted claims. When Congress has affirmatively
stated how it would like a statute to be implemented, separation of
powers concerns arise when courts recognize different means of en-
forcement. 55 Separation of powers principles require the branches of
government to respect power that the Constitution unambiguously
commits to a coordinate branch.156 The doctrine assigns to Congress
the function of enunciating applicable rules of law and to the judiciary
the function of interpreting those rules in cases or controversies. 5 7
Accordingly, courts "may not properly impair the legislature's choice
of enforcer in the absence of a constitutional mandate.".8
As a result, courts have looked to the legislative intent behind
statutes to determine whether Congress intended to allow a section
1983 or other implied right of action. 59 In enacting the anti-kickback
statute, Congress's function was to enunciate the applicable rule of
false claims action, not the qui tam plaintiff. See supra note 123. Thus, the federal statute in
question creates no enforceable rights in the qui tam plaintiff.
151. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520-21.
152. Id. at 521 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)).
153. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989).
154. See Frederick, supra note 147, at 644-45.
155. In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
15 (1981), the Court stated that "[i]n the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional
intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it consid-
ered appropriate."
156. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S.
516, 530 (1933).
157. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
158. Marra v. Burgdorf Realtors, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1000, 1013-14 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
159. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377-78
(1982); Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13.
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law for dealing with kickbacks in transactions involving federal
health care programs. The judiciary's function is to interpret the
anti-kickback statute in cases or controversies, not to create new
remedies and enforcement procedures.
To conclude, tainted claims are structurally similar to section
1983 claims based on federal statutory violations: Both would provide
a private citizen with the right to pursue a federal statutory claim
simply by qualifying as a plaintiff under either of these remedial
statutes. 160 Further, the same separation of powers concerns are
relevant for evaluating the suitability of a valid right of action for a
private plaintiff under section 1983 as under the False Claims Act.161
These claims' structural similarities and the correlative separation of
powers concerns make it fitting to use section 1983's analytical tools
to evaluate the propriety of anti-kickback-based false claims actions.
Applying section 1983 preclusion analysis demonstrates that, in
recognizing these claims as valid causes of action, courts alter the
anti-kickback statute's congressionally devised statutory remedial
scheme. In so doing, courts overstep their constitutionally defined
roles by enunciating or modifying policy decisions rightfully reserved
to Congress.
B. The Anti-Kickback Statute's Remedial Scheme
First and foremost, the anti-kickback statute provides for fel-
ony criminal penalties62 of up to $25,000 and five years imprison-
ment.163 Investigations of alleged violations may be made by a num-
ber of government entities, including the OIG for the HHS.164 Because
the proceedings involve criminal penalties, the Department of Justice,
under the authority of the Attorney General, must bring any actions
against health care providers. 65
Second, the Secretary of HHS may apply the administrative
remedies available under the Civil Monetary Penalties Law
160. Of course, section 1983 explicitly provides injured private citizens with redress for per-
sonal injuries, while the False Claims Act, according to the tainted claim theory of liability,
provides a qui tam plaintiff the right to pursue the government's injuries under the anti-kick-
back statute by clothing the claim in the False Claims Act.
161. See Marra, 726 F. Supp. at 1013-14 (arguing separation of powers concerns preclude
finding a judicially created qui tam provision in the underlying statute).
162. Anti-kickback violations, originally misdemeanors, were upgraded to felonies in 1987.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994).
163. See id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2).
164. See id. § 1320a-7a(j)(2).
165. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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("CMPL")166 to assess penalties against providers who violate the anti-
kickback statute. Specifically, providers who violate the anti-kick-
back statute are now subject to civil monetary penalties of up to
$50,000 for each anti-kickback violation, as well as treble damages.167
Furthermore, the CMPL was originally enacted to provide the
Secretary with an administrative remedy "akin to the False Claims
Act,"168 indicating that Congress found the False Claims Act insuffi-
cient, perhaps even inappropriate, for dealing with claims submitted
in connection with an anti-kickback violation. The CMPL also pro-
vides a remedy for conduct that may trigger a violation of the False
Claims Act itself. Specifically, CMPL penalties may be assessed
against any person who presents or causes to be presented to the
United States a claim for an item or services the person knows is,
inter alia, false or fraudulent. 69 Further, while the civil penalties
under the CMPL mirror the False Claims Act's sanctions in that they
both contain a set penalty and treble damages, they differ in amount:
a $50,000 penalty under the CMPL, and a $10,000 penalty under the
False Claims Act. 70
The specific administrative procedures governing the imposi-
tion of a civil monetary penalty are defined by federal law,17 and pro-
vide that the Secretary of HHS can initiate an enforcement pro-
ceeding only with the agreement of the Attorney General,72 and only
according to specific procedures that the Attorney General defines. 173
Thus, the ability of the Secretary to bring these claims, and the pro-
cedures the Secretary must follow, are derived from and subject to the
power of the Attorney General, which indicates congressional intent
to keep these remedies firmly within the Attorney General's control.
Third, the CMPL provides for the exclusion of a provider from
federal and state health care programs for violations of the anti-kick-
back statute.7 4 Federal regulations contain elaborate and complex
166. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2105(a), 95 Stat. 357,
789 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(7)); see S. REP. No. 97-139, at 461-62 (1981), reprinted in
1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 727-28 (discussing the operation of civil monetary penalties).
167. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 § 2105(a).
168. John J. Meyer et al., Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Enforcement and Compliance
(1997] Health L. & Bus. Seiries (BNA), at 2600.03.D.l.a.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(B).
170. See Meyer et al., supra note 168, at 2600.03.D.1.b nn.197-98 (noting the close
alignment of CMPL and False Claims Act penalties).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(c)(1).
172. See id.
173. See id.




guidelines for determining when exclusion is an appropriate rem-
edy.175 Federal law provides the framework for appeals from decisions
to exclude: a hearing before an administrative law judge.176
The statute also controls the interaction between and the
choice of remedies. The Attorney General empowers the OIG to initi-
ate a CMPL proceeding,17  to decide whether the government will seek
civil monetary penalties, exclusion, or both in a specific case, 178 and to
decide whether to settle or to litigate the administrative sanctions. 179
These decisions are often made in light of parallel, yet unrelated, false
claims actions at issue in the same case. 180 Procedural safeguards for
the imposition of exclusionary sanctions outlined by federal statute
include the provider's right to "reasonable notice and opportunity for
a hearing" before an administrative law judge,s1 and the right to
judicial review in district court. 8 2
C. Application of Section 1983's "Sufficiently Comprehensive"
Standard to the Anti-Kickback Statute's Remedial Scheme
Applying section 1983 standards by analogy, courts should not
permit qui tam plaintiffs to pursue anti-kickback claims under the
False Claims Act if the anti-kickback statute contains a remedial
scheme "sufficiently comprehensive" to protect the government's
interest in ridding federally funded health care programs of unlawful
kickbacks. Such comprehensiveness would indicate congressional
intent to preclude a remedy under the False Claims Act.18 3 Although
courts have struggled to define "sufficiently comprehensive" in the
section 1983 context,M the anti-kickback statute's remedial and
enforcement schemes are both sufficiently comprehesive under any
analysis to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy
175. See, e.g., Criteria for Implementing Permissive Exclusion Authority under Section
1128(b)(7) of the Social Security Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,410 (1997) (providing specific factors to be
used in assessing a permissive exclusion decision).
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f)(1); Appeal of Exclusions, 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2007 (1997).
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(j)(2).
178. See Meyer et al., supra note 168, at 2600.03.D.l.b.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f)(1).
182. See id.
183. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 521 (1990) (noting that a statute's
remedial scheme may be sufficiently comprehensive to preclude a remedy under section 1983).
184. See Frederick, supra note 147, at 640-43 (describing courts' wildly varying section
1983 preclusion analyses under the Food Stamp Act).
1038 [Vol. 51:1003
FALSE CLAIMS
of a false claims action for conduct consisting of nothing more than a
payment of remuneration. 185
First, one of the most important factors in a court's section
1983 analysis is whether the underlying federal statute contains a
private right of action.1' Where a statute provides a private right of
action, courts find that the statute contains an effective remedial
procedure that nullifies the need for a section 1983 remedy.187 As the
Supreme Court has noted, these private judicial remedies indicate
"congressional intent to supplant the [section] 1983 remedy."88
The anti-kickback statute contains no private right of action,
but it does contain a right of action for the party "injured" by anti-
kickback violations: the government. In fact, as noted in Part VIII.B,
the statute provides the government with multiple avenues to enforce
its rights under the statute. The fact that a private citizen has no
right of action is immaterial to the analysis of the anti-kickback-based
tainted claim. The qui tam plaintiffs only claim to a right of action
stems from the government's rights under the False Claims Act.18 9
Thus, the qui tam plaintiffs right of action under the Act is only
incidental to the government's own right to a remedy. For purposes of
the anti-kickback statute, the qui tam plaintiffs incidental rights are
simply irrelevant: The real party of interest to the anti-kickback
violation already has a right to bring an action under the statute
itself. There is no need to provide the government with a statutory
vehicle to pursue violations of a statute that it has the right to pursue
already.
Second, in determining whether a federal statute provides a
comprehensive remedial scheme, courts in section 1983 cases consider
whether the statute provides for private judicial remedies and proce-
dures by which plaintiffs can address defendants' federal statutory
violations.190 For example, in Wright v. City of Roanoke
185. See Lisa Stamm, Note, Section 1983 and Title IV-D of the Social Security Act: In
Pursuit of Improved Child Support Enforcement, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 221, 229-33 (1991), for a
discussion of the various factors a court will consider in deciding whether a section 1983 cause
of action is precluded.
186. See Frederick, supra note 147, at 646-49 (discussing preclusion analysis where under-
lying statute permits a private right of action).
187. See id. at 646.
188. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 427 (1987) (noting
that in the other cases in which the Supreme Court found a section 1983 action precluded, the
underlying staute contained a private right of action).
189. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
190. See Ashish Prasad, Note, Rights Without Remedies: Section 1983 Enforcement of Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 197, 217-21 (1993), for a discussion of the
development and use of the "comprehensive remedial scheme" test.
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Redevelopment & Housing Authority, the Supreme Court carefully
analyzed the Brook Amendment's administrative hearing and review
procedures to determine whether the underlying statute provided the
injured party with adequate redress.191 The anti-kickback statute
creates detailed procedures for administrative and judicial review, by
which a plaintiff, that is the government, can address violations of the
statute.192 Just as the presence of such details "indicates] a precise
remedial scheme that 'may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly
under [section] 1983,' "193 the anti-kickback statute's detailed provi-
sions demonstrate the impropriety of an anti-kickback-based tainted
claim.
Another factor in the section 1983 preclusion mix is the integ-
rity of the underlying statutory scheme and whether a section 1983
claim would undermine this integrity.9 4 Courts have held that a sec-
tion 1983 claim is precluded where section 1983 relief and relief under
the statute would be inconsistent.195
Inconsistencies between statutory remedies and those avail-
able through the False Claims Act indicate Congress did not intend to
leave False Claims Act remedies available to qui tam plaintiffs.196
Where the violation of the anti-kickback statute might lead to crimi-
nal liablity under the anti-kickback statute, the same behavior can
lead only to civil penalties under the False Claims Act. Even where
civil monetary penalties are sought for an anti-kickback violation, the
penalty schemes in the CMPL and the False Claims Act look similar
but provide for different amounts: a $50,000 per service or per item
penalty under the CMPL and $10,000 per claim penalty under the
False Claims Act.197 If permitted, anti-kickback-based tainted claims
would undermine the integrity of the False Claims Act's scheme by
providing different liability potential under the different penalty
schemes: If the same conduct can give rise to liability under the
CMPL or the False Claims Act, a provider's liability depends not on
191. See 479 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1987).
192. See supra Part VIII.B.
193. See Almond Hill School v. United States Dep't of Agric., 768 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.
1985) (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
20 (1981)) (determining that a section 1983 claim is precluded by the remedial scheme of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act).
194. See Stamm, supra note 185, at 231.
195. See Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1216 (7th Cir. 1981).
196. See Almond Hill School, 768 F.2d at 1038 (finding that the delegation of primary en-
forcement responsibility in a federal act is inconsistent with allowing a private right of action
under section 1983).
197. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
1040 [Vol. 51:1003
FALSE CLAIMS
his conduct, but on the identity of the plaintiff, that is, the Secretary
of HHS or a qui tam plaintiff.
Second, the different scienter elements of the anti-kickback
statute and the False Claims Act demonstrate additional inconsisten-
cies that argue against tainted claims enforcement. As noted in Part
III, the anti-kickback statute requires specific intent; whereas the
False Claims Act requires only "reckless disregard" for or "deliberate
ignorance" of the falsity of a claim. At least one critic has argued that
Congress's intent in defining the anti-kickback scienter requirement
demonstrates an intent to punish only that conduct involving the
higher level of intent.198 Allowing plaintiffs to pursue anti-kickback
claims in connection with the False Claims Act's lower scienter stan-
dard thus undermines both the deliberate enforcement policy
Congress intended to create for the anti-kickback statute, and con-
gressional intent to provide a "uniform" scienter standard for False
Claims Act prosecution.199
Third, the anti-kickback statute's complex enforcement scheme
is inconsistent with the enforcement scheme that the use of the False
Claims Act would create. Section 1320a provides a complex scheme of
enforcement whereby it delegates total responsibilty for anti-kickback
enforcement to the government: 200 either to the Department of Justice
for criminal sanctions, 20 1 or to the Secretary of HHS for civil
sanctions. 20 2 The Secretary's powers originate in and are subject to
the authority of the Attorney General, 20 3 indicating a highly
comprehensive and integrated remedial scheme where various
government entities are ascribed specific and limited roles. The
False Claims Act would allow a private citizen to undermine the
delicate balance of power brokered by the statute. The statutory
scheme governing anti-kickback violations "reflects a 'balance,





198. See Salcido, supra note 40, at 132-33.
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 213 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378,
540 (stating that the purpose of the anti-kickback statute's monetary penalties "is to facilitate
the timely and effective prosecution of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse cases by the
Federal Government" and making references exclusively to the pursuit of anti-kickback
violations by the government).
201. United States Attorneys have plenary authority over federal criminal matters. See
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9.2.000 (1994).
202. See supra note 166.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320-7a(c)(1) (1994).
204. Almond Hill School v. United States Dep't of Agric., 768 F.2d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir.
1985) (quoting Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976)) (finding such factors indicative of
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The administrative and judicial enforcement procedures for
anti-kickback violations are detailed comprehensively under one
cohesive statutory section: 42 U.S.C. § 1320a.205 The anti-kickback
statute's comprehensive remedial scheme indicates Congress's intent
to deal directly with the perceived negative consequences of remu-
neration in health care transactions.206 The statute provides for en-
forcement only by the various governmental entities mentioned above,
and provides no private right of action.20 7 The statute's remedial ex-
clusivity seems aimed at preserving prosecutorial flexibility in dealing
with potential anti-kickback violations. The delicate remedial balance
inherent in granting the Attorney General and the Secretary of HHS
broad discretion over both the remedies for and pursuit of these
claims would be severely compromised, however, if private citizens
were allowed to pursue a False Claims remedy for the same conduct.
The range of remedies available to the government under 42
U.S.C. § 1320a itself indicates a comprehensive scheme devised to
allow the government flexibility in choosing a remedy appropriate for
a given case. The flexibility inherent in such wide prosecutorial
discretion is very much a part of how the government currently
enforces the anti-kickback statute. This prosecutorial discretion is
particularly important because the statute criminalizes otherwise
economically beneficial market behavior, much of which is considered
business as usual in the health care industry.208 Thus, financial
inducements that technically qualify as "kickbacks" are exchanged
openly on a daily basis.20 9 As one scholar has noted, prosecutors
realize that this otherwise lawful and efficient behavior could trigger
Congress's intent to foreclose section 1983 remedies for violation of the underlying federal
statute).
205. See supra Part VIII.B (explaining the remedial scheme).
206. The anti-kickback statute is designed to prevent overutilization of federally funded
health care services, constrain the cost of federally funded health care programs, and, arguably,
protect a patient's interest in the freedom to choose a health care provider and to avoid over-
treatment. See Blumstein, supra note 37, at 207-11 (pointing out the inconsistencies between
the statute's purported goals and the current incentives for underutilization in systems involv-
ing captitated or other risk-sharing arrangements).
207. See supra Part VII.
208. See Blumstein, supra note 37, at 213 (stating that arrangements permissible in other
contexts may be illegal in the health care arena); see also James F. Blumstein, What Precisely
Is "Fraud" in the Health Care Industry?, WALL STREET J., Dec. 8, 1997, at A25 [hereinafter
Blumstein, Fraud] (noting that "doing a good job" or even supplying free doughnuts for a
physician's lounge could trigger anti-kickback liability); Even Doughnuts May Count as
Kickbacks, IG Warns in Letter, HEALTHCARE Bus. & LEGAL STRATEGIES, Apr. 10, 1996, at 5
(stating "trinkets such as doughnuts and mugs may be violating the Medicare anti-kickback
law, even though the inducement seems trivial").
209. See Blumstein, Fraud, supra note 208, at A25 (noting that financial incentives capable
of triggering anti-kickback liability have become "part of the fabric of the health care industry").
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anti-kickback liability and have assured health care entities that they
will prosecute only egregious violations that either hurt health care
program beneficiaries or cost the government money.210 In essence,
prosecutors assure providers they will ignore merely technical
violations of the law,211 thus turning the health care industry into
what has been called "a speakeasy, with wholesale illegal conduct
taking place but being winked at by prosecutors" who say they will
prosecute only "the loud and obnoxious drunks."21 2
Anti-kickback-based tainted claims frustrate this practical
implementation of the anti-kickback statute by undermining the gov-
ernment's commitment to prosecute only harmful violations of the
statute. The potential personal recovery available to a qui tam plain-
tiff would provide an overwhelming incentive to bring anti-kickback
claims via the False Claims Act for any potential violation of the stat-
ute. The constant threat of qui tam litigation would disrupt the reli-
ance on prosecutorial discretion in the statute's enforcement. In
addition, recognizing anti-kickback-based tainted claims could further
encourage baseless or harrassing suits by professional litigants who
could further hinder the already cumbersome administration of the
anti-kickback statute. After all, the qui tam plaintiffs goal is finan-
cial gain, not justice.
D. Practical and Policy Considerations Supporting Preclusion
The anti-kickback statute's comprehensive remedies and rig-
orous procedures reflect Congress's intent to limit the remedies
available to the government for anti-kickback violations. However,
practical and policy considerations equally demonstrate the inadvis-
ability of anti-kickback-based tainted claims. Specifically, extending
a False Claims Act "bounty" to qui tam plaintiffs who pursue anti-
kickback claims contradicts the practical use of the statute and would
undermine recent government efforts to curb health care fraud and
abuse.
On a practical level, Congress has recognized the complexity of
the anti-kickback statute. 21 3 In fact, the statute's remedial scheme is
210. See id.
211. According to Professor James F. Blumstein of Vanderbilt University School of Law, an
estimated 80% of anti-kickback violations go unprosecuted.
212. Blumstein, Fraud, supra note 208, at A25.
213. In enacting section 14(a), Congress recognized that the statutory language of 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2)(B) (predecessor to current section 1320a-7b(b)) "has created uncertainty
among health care providers as to which commercial arrangements are legitimate, and which
are proscribed." S. REP. No. 100-109, at 27 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 682, 707-08.
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so detailed and complex that the most recent amendments to the
statute contained several provisions aimed at clarifying exactly what
conduct will subject a provider to penalites2 14 and providing a more
organized framework for the various enforcement entities.215
Moreover, in the entire history of the statute, in spite of its
amendments and changes and all the problems Congress has at-
tempted to address, never once did Congress discuss or even refer to
any of the monumental problems that qui tam enforcement of the
anti-kickback statute implies. The reason for this enduring omission
seems quite clear: Congress never intended for the False Claims Act
to serve as the statutory vehicle for qui tam plaintiffs to bring anti-
kickback claims.
In other contexts, courts have acknowledged Congress's inte-
gral statutory scheme and the dangers inherent in extending reme-
dies to private parties. As one court noted in its inquiry into how the
anti-kickback statute should be enforced, "[w]hether this purpose
would be better achieved by arming [private parties] with the author-
ity to enforce the provisions of [the anti-kickback statute] is a judg-
ment better left to Congress."216 Anti-kickback-based tainted claims
should engender the same judicial restraint. In addition, the False
Claims Act's qui tam provisions have produced a "chilling effect" on
employee and employer communications. 21 7 Extending liability under
the False Claims Act to anti-kickback violations could chill further
good faith efforts to implement compliance plans to detect anti-kick-
back violations. While it is true that the government maintains some
control over a qui tam plaintiffs suit, this supervision itself does not
justify the expansion of the anti-kickback statute.
In view of the complexity and comprehensiveness of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a, allowing a qui tam plaintiff to bring a claim via the False
Claims Act would be inconsistent with congressional intent to create a
214. See, for example, the Senate Report accompanying the 1987 Amendment which
enabled HHS to promulgate "safe harbors," making it clear that the purpose of the legislation
was to reign in the anti-kickback statute. See id.
215. In fact, to manage jurisdictional and prosecutorial overlap, the 1996 amendments in-
cluded the creation of a Fraud and Abuse Control Program to coordinate federal, state, and local
health care anti-fraud enforcement programs. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7c(a) (West Supp. 1998).
216. West Allis Mem'l Hosp., Inc., v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251, 255 (7th Cir. 1988).
217. See Morning Edition: "Qui Tam" Suits Put Government Defrauders on Ice (NPR radio
broadcast, Sept. 24, 1997) (Attorney Robert Salcido explaining that making employees potential
bounty hunters on behalf of the government "chills internal discourse between employees and
companies" and discourages internal fraud investigations because knowing about fraud can
increase the risk of being sued).
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"carefully tailored scheme"218 for addressing illegal remuneration in
federal health care programs. As a result, courts validating these
claims have allowed qui tam plaintiffs to intentionally circumvent the
anti-kickback statute's carefully defined remedial scheme and to
undermine congressional intent by bringing their anti-kickback
claims under the False Claims Act. Using the vehicle of the False
Claims Act, then, private parties gain access to the courts, under a
less demanding statute and in direct contradiction to the enforcement
scheme Congress created.
Not only does analysis under the standards defined in section
1983 cases indicate congressional intent to foreclose a false claims
remedy for anti-kickback violations, it should be easier to establish
congressional intent to preclude use of the False Claims Act than
establish preclusion under section 1983. Under a traditional section
1983 analysis, the defendant bears the burden of affirmatively
showing that Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement of
the underlying statute.219 The reason for placing the burden on the
defendant in these cases is that the language of section 1983 clearly
indicates that section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of other
federal statutes. 20 In other words, because Congress expressly pro-
vided that violations of other federal statutes may be pursued prop-
erly under section 1983, courts must assume Congress intended to
allow an underlying statute to be enforced via a section 1983 claim,
unless the defendant can show the court that Congress specifically
intended to disallow such enforcement.
In contrast, the False Claims Act does not expressly provide a
remedy for violations of other federal statutes. Logically, then, the
burden of proof should not fall on a false claims defendant to show
that Congress intended to allow the underlying statute, the anti-kick-
back statute, to be enforced via the False Claims Act. Plus, under the
Supreme Court's recent analysis of section 1983, the plaintiff now
seems to have the burden of demonstrating the availability of a sec-
tion 1983 remedy.221 In light of the Supreme Court's recent trend of
218. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984) (defining rule in context of section 1983
claims).
219. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520-21 (1990). The defendant in
section 1983 cases is, by the nature of the claim, a government entity.
220. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989)
(stating that section 1983's coverage must be broadly construed).
221. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 361 & n.11 (1992) (stating that even if the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act does not expressly provide a comprehensive reme-
dial scheme, the Act still precludes section 1983 enforcement); see also id. at 376-77 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (accusing majority of inverting burden of proof in showing preclusion of section
19981 1045
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
restricting the scope of section 1983's explicit statutory vehicle, any
argument for broadly construing the implicit use of the False Claims
Act as such a statutory vehicle seems misplaced.
In sum, applying the comprehensive remedial scheme analysis
developed for section 1983 claims demonstrates that allowing a qui
tam plaintiff to bring an anti-kickback action by robing it as a false
claims action "would be inconsistent with Congress's carefully tailored
scheme."222  In recognizing these claims as valid causes of action,
courts distort and expand the remedies available for an anti-kickback
violation and short circuit Congress's statutory construct.
IX. CONCLUSION
Leaving to the courts the determination of whether a private
party may bring an anti-kickback claim using the False Claims Act is
unfair. In this issue courts face competing statutory interests and
policy goals. On one hand, the False Claims Act is used expansively
to protect the government from paying on fraudulent claims. Further,
health care fraud, undeniably, is a tremendous problem, and the gov-
ernment needs effective tools to combat this problem. Thus, the al-
lure of using the False Claims Act in waging the war against health
care fraud is understandable. The Act is an effective and efficient
means of deterring and punishing this abuse. In addition, allowing
qui tam plaintiffs to bring tainted claims actions would make it easier
to discover and prosecute the illegal behavior.
However, qui tam false claims actions based on violations of
the anti-kickback statute expose health care providers to the risk of
substantial penalties and damages for harmless standard practices.
2 3
Furthermore, the anti-kickback statute's provisions, remedial
schemes, and punitive measures represent the majoritarian branch's
delicately negotiated balance of the need to curb health care fraud and
the fear of overdeterrence and overenforcement in this heavily regu-
lated industry.
In the short term, if courts do not wish to trump Congress's
constitutionally ascribed function, the courts must use the anti-kick-
back statute only as instructed. These instructions come from the
anti-kickback statute itself, not from the False Claims Act. Therefore,
1983 claim); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.6, at
439-40 (Supp. 1997) (agreeing with dissent's characterization of majority's opinion in Suter).
222. Robinson, 468 U.S.at 1012.
223. See Jaeger & Diesenhaus, supra note 3, at 832.
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courts should not allow private citizens to prosecute anti-kickback
violations, even under the guise of the False Claims Act. In the long
run, however, Congress would be well-advised to define clearly the
respective roles of both statutes. If Congress wishes the anti-kickback
statute to serve as a vehicle for False Claims Act claims, it should say
so in the text of the False Claims Act itself or amend the False Claims
Act to provide guidelines for evaluating whether an underlying
statute may be used as an enforcement vehicle. Alternatively,
Congress could amend the anti-kickback statute to allow private
litigant prosecution. Moreover, the HHS could promulgate a
regulation to the same effect.
Analysis by analogy to section 1983 claims, however, makes
clear the separation of powers and policy problems inherent in allow-
ing private citizens to expand and distort the anti-kickback statute's
remedial and enforcement schemes. Accordingly, Congress would be
better advised to make clear that the False Claims Act may not serve
as a remedial statutory vehicle for anti-kickback violations.
Furthermore, only the government should prosecute suspected viola-
tions of a federal statute. Congress is free to enlist the help of private
citizens, for example, by providing monetary rewards for information
leading to anti-kickback convictions. Congress, nevertheless, should
clarify this position against anti-kickback-based tainted claims, and,
in light of the imminent popularity of these claims, it should do so
quickly.
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